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A MODEL FOR DETERMINING THE EXCESSIVE




Courts and commentators have long considered annual turnover rates a sig-
nificant factor in evaluating the excessive trading element of churning claims.
These authorities, however, have lacked coherent guidelines for assessing the im-
portance of investor objectives in the determination of whether a particular turno-
ver rate for a broker-managed investment account is excessive.
In this Article Professors Donald Winslow and Seth Anderson set forth a
statistical study of annual turnover rates exhibited by nine different categories of
mutual funds with diverse investment strategies. The authors randomly selected
test samples for each category from industry turnover rate data compiled over ten
years. Because a mutual fund manager's compensation does not depend upon
trading activity, in theory mutual funds should experience optimal turnover rates
necessary to pursue the funds' objective. These authors propose guidelines for us-
ing annual turnover rates exhibited by mutual funds as reference points for evalu-
ating whether excessive trading has occurred in broker-managed investment
accounts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Churning of a customer investment account occurs when a broker over-
trades the securities in the account for the purpose of generating commissions.'
This simple description belies the numerous complex issues facing a customer
who seeks a judgment against a broker for churning damages. Courts generally
require a plaintiff-customer to prove three elements to recover under a churning
claim: (1) "control" over the account by the broker; (2) excessive trading in the
account in light of the customer's objectives; and (3) scienter, an intent to de-
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1. Note, Customer Sophistication and a Plaintiff's Duty of Due Diligence: A Proposed Frame-
work for Churning Actions in Nondiscretionary Accounts Under Rule lOb-5, 54 FORDHAM L. REv.
1101, 1101 (1986) [hereinafter FORDHAM Note]. As broadly phrased over 20 years ago, churning
occurs "when a dealer, acting in his own interests and against those of his customer, induces transac-
tions in the customer's account which are excessive in size and frequency in light of the character of
the account." Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869, 869 (1967) [hereinafter
HARVARD Note].
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fraud or a reckless disregard of the customer's best interests by the broker.2 The
apparent precision and clarity of this statement of the churning elements masks
the difficulty of determining the existence of churning in a particular case. Each
of these elements possesses a degree of analytical difficulty. 3
Of the three elements, excessive trading is perhaps the most difficult for
plaintiffs to establish and the most troublesome for courts to evaluate.4 This
issue is difficult to analyze because under current practices no single standard
exists for determining what constitutes excessive trading.5 The lack of a defini-
tive standard derives from the relevance of the investor's objectives. Since those
objectives lie along a wide spectrum and different objectives require investment
in distinct security portfolios, presumably with various optimal levels of trading
to achieve the stated goals, no single level of trading should be considered a
definitive threshold.6 The problem remains, however, that courts lack coherent
2. This basic "definition of 'churning' . . . has been generally accepted" by the courts, R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 640 (6th ed. 1987);
see, eg., Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2846 (1988); Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.
1987); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985);
Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1984); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th
Cir. 1980); Franks v. Cavanaugh, 711 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Woodruff v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F. Supp. 181, 183 (D. Neb. 1989); Smith v. Petrou, 705 F. Supp.
183, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also O'Hara, The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Clains
Under Federal Securities and Commodities Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1875, 1889 n.39 (1987) (listing addi-
tional cases citing three essential elements); Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a
New Context, 39 Bus. LAW. 571, 578 n.45 (1984) (same).
The three elements listed correspond to the language in the rules promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Rule 15cl-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
directly supports the first two elements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15ci-7 (1988). That rule, however, is
nominally limited to accounts with respect to which the broker holds discretionary authority, and
the statute pursuant to which rule 15cl-7 was promulgated limits its scope to transactions on the
over-the-counter market. See id. § 240.15cl-7(b) to -8; O'Hara, supra, at 1884 & n.23. Despite re-
strictions on the scope of this rule, it is well settled that churning also violates the broad antifraud
provisions of the securities laws, including section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule l0b-5, which was
promulgated under it. In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1405-06 (E.D. Pa.
1984); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; infra note 31 (discussing section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5). The bulk of private actions for churning have been brought under these provisions.
See O'Hara, supra, at 1885-86. Because rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) actions require scienter, churn-
ing claims under these sections generally require scienter as a third element. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5;
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp 1106, 1111-12 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 795 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986).
3. For an extensive treatment of the cases on the excessive trading and scienter elements and a
particularly thorough description and treatment of the control element, see O'Hara, supra note 2, at
1889-95, 1899-931.
4. See id. at 1891.
5. See, eg., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodities Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (exces-
sive trading element "cannot be determined by any precise rule or formula"); FORDHAM Note, supra
note 1, at 1103-04 (noting confusion in several areas including the separation of the excessive trading
element and the scienter element); Comment, The Lack of a Definite Standard to Measure Excessive
Trading Activity in Over-the-Counter Customers' Securities Accounts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 116, 117-18
(1967) (no single standard for determining excessive trading). This statement does not deny that
other issues also may present difficulties. See O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1933 (observing that reliance
has been a very difficult issue for the courts).
6. Once it is acknowledged that the level of trading must be viewed in light of the investor's
investment goals to determine excessiveness, an absolute bright-line test becomes impossible. Jacobs,
The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869, 932
(1972); O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1891.
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guidelines to determine if a certain level of trading is excessive.
The most direct means of measuring the trading level in an account is to use
some version of the quantitative turnover rate or ratio in the account. 7 This rate
generally represents the number of times the investments in the account are liq-
uidated and reinvested in a given period.8 For example, an account would expe-
rience an annual turnover rate of one if all the investments in the account were
sold and the proceeds reinvested during the same year.
The courts and commentators using quantitative turnover rates to deal with
the excessive trading issue, however, have used them without satisfactory analy-
sis.9 To some extent, their analysis has drifted due to lack of a basis in financial
theory. There is little, if anything, of substance that can be gleaned from the
cases as to why a particular rate is or is not excessive or how, precisely, invest-
ment objectives should influence that inquiry. The symptoms of this lack of
financial grounding have been imprecision and timidity in use of quantitative
turnover rates as a factor indicative of excessive trading.
This Article focuses exclusively on the excessive trading element of churn-
ing claims, in particular on the quantitative measure of this element by use of the
turnover rate. The Article sets forth a study of turnover rates in mutual funds
for the years 1978 to 1987. By analyzing the trading activity for mutual funds
with diverse investor objectives, this Article attempts to establish more coherent
and precise guidelines for use of turnover rates to determine whether excessive
trading has occurred in broker-managed accounts. In particular, the study per-
mitted a categorical estimation of expected turnover rates for broker-managed
accounts with diverse investment objectives. The findings of this study should
assist in determining, for any particular investment account, whether the broker
pursued the customer's investment goals. By comparing the activity level or
turnover rate for the customer's account with the expected turnover rates (based
on this study) for mutual funds with comparable investor objectives, courts will
be able to better determine whether the broker's trading was excessive. The
findings of this Article demonstrate that prior authorities generally have been
too reluctant to find that excessive trading activity is indicated by turnover rates.
The Article concludes that analysis of the data from mutual funds presents the
possibility of a more precise use of turnover rates and that these rates should
take on increased importance in determining whether excessive trading has
occurred.
II. BACKGROUND ON CHURNING AND CURRENT CONTEXT
Given the compensation structure of the securities industry, it is not sur-
prising that excessive trading is quite common. The brokerage industry's com-
pensation structure rests on the volume of trading activity in customer
accounts.10 Transactions conducted in customer accounts generate profits in the
7. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1891.
8. Id.; Poser, supra note 2, at 582.
9. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
10. Poser, supra note 2, at 573.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
form of commissions charged by securities brokerage firms."t Approximately
thirty to forty percent of the commission paid by the customer to the investment
firm flows directly to the individual registered representative who handled the
account. 12 This person is commonly referred to as the "broker."'1 3 Like any
salesperson who is compensated through sales commissions, brokers employed
by these firms generally receive compensation only when their customers trade
in their accounts by buying or selling stock.
t4
Because of this compensation system, both the firm and the broker enjoy a
substantial financial benefit from increased trading activity in a customer's ac-
count, regardless of any gain to the customer from this trading.' 5 A broker thus
possesses a terrific incentive to increase the frequency of trading in the cus-
tomer's account. 16 In the extreme case, a broker might profit tremendously
from accelerated trading while the customer suffers severe losses from poorly
performing investments consumed by increased commissions.
The compensation structure creates one side of a potential conflict of inter-
est situation for brokers regarding their customers; the conflict is completed by
another aspect of the brokers' business-the touting of themselves as "invest-
ment advisors."' 17 In order to make their income, securities brokers typically
solicit buy-and-sell orders for which they receive commission income from their
clients. In addition, they dispense free advice concerning specific investment
vehicles. Many large brokerage firms spend substantial sums advertising their
investment advice as the best and most reliable available. These efforts naturally
cause customers to rely upon their judgment and recommendations.' 8 The fi-
nancial incentive presented to brokers by the industry compensation structure,
however, can impair that judgment and bias those recommendations. These
dual roles of commission salesperson and dispenser of investment advice present
the broker with an inescapable conflict of interest: the temptation exists to gen-
erate commission income by advising that a security be bought or sold, irrespec-
tive of the customer's needs. Given this potential for abuse by brokers, it is not
11. Id. at 573-76. A firm executing a customer order to buy or sell a security functions in the
capacity of a broker. 5B A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 101-5 § 210.02, at
9-5 (2d rev. ed. 1988). A firm selling from or purchasing for its own inventory acts in the role of
dealer. Id. at 9-5 to -6. The focus of this Article is on the acts of these firms as brokers.
12. Poser, supra note 2, at 573.
13. Although in legal jargon the brokerage firm often is referred to as a "broker," this Article
will refer to the individual registered representative as the "broker" and to the brokerage firm as the
"firm."
14. See 1 S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACTIcES § 2.2[a], at 2-3, 2-8 to -
10 (broker's compensation dependent on commissions generated for firm); Poser, supra note 2, at
573-76 (same).
15. 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, § 2.1, at 2-3 (just as with a poker casino or a parimutuel
horsetrack, a brokerage firm and its representatives face a system that means "the more action, the
higher the total amount of the cut and the greater the ultimate profits").
16. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) ("as long
as investment brokers have remunerated on a commission basis, the potential has existed for brokers
to excessively trade accounts in an effort to generate fees").
17. 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, § 2.2[a], at 2-8 to -10 ("[n]o clearer example of a conflict of
interests can be imagined"); Poser, supra note 2, at 573-76; HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 870.
18. See O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1879 (arguing that customer's reliance on broker should be
guiding inquiry on the control issue in churning cases).
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surprising that litigation over alleged overtrading of customer accounts has long
abounded. 19
Enormous changes in the securities industry over the past fifteen years have
created greater incentives for brokers to churn customers' accounts. First,
churning has been stimulated by the declining profit margins experienced by
brokerage firms as a result of the introduction of competitive commission rates
on May Day, 1975.20 The increased competition has resulted in higher pressure
on individual representatives to produce.2 1 This pressure has been magnified by
the accompanying increase in commissions flowing through to individual bro-
kers from their firms in order to encourage further production and attract pro-
ducing brokers. 22 These factors make overtrading accounts more profitable than
was previously the case.
23
A review of the current state of. affairs indicates that the problem of churn-
19. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (for as
long as brokers have been compensated on a commission basis "churning" cases "have dotted the
federal docket"). It has been suggested that the securities industry needs to develop a new compen-
sation system "that rewards brokers for their efforts on behalf of customers, not for defrauding
them." Pinto & Poser, Brokers Who Trade Too Often, Wall St. J., May 20, 1985, at 26, col. 3; Haas,
Let's Put Brokers on a Straight Salary, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1977, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
20. Govoni, The Problem With Churning, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 4-17, 1985, at 76-78; Pinto &
Poser, supra note 19, at 26, col. 3. As stated by Professor Poser: "By May 1, 1975, all commission
rates paid by public customers became subject to negotiation." Poser, Restructuring the Stock Mar-
kets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 901 (1981); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (1982) (section 6(e) of the 1934 Act) (prohibiting national securities ex-
changes from fixing commissions to be charged by their members); Exchange Act Release No.
11,203, 40 Fed. Reg. 7394 (1975) (adopting rule 19b-3 as prohibition on fixed commissions); Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,180, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,205 (1988) (rescinding rule 19b-3 as redundant in
light of the statutory provision in section 6 of the 1934 Act). For a thorough discussion of the fixed
commission structure and other compensation in the industry in the pre-1975 era, see Ratner, Regu-
lation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 348 (1970) (current as of
January 20, 1970).
21. See Poser, supra note 2, at 575. Brokerage houses generally imposed tougher production
quotas on their brokers, making it necessary for those individuals to increase the size and frequency
of transactions handled in order to shore up their firms' profits and their own paychecks. See gener-
ally Govoni, supra note 20 (discussing the results of brokerage firm quotas); Poser, supra note 2, at
575 (arguing that increased competition has led to intensified pressure on brokers by firms).
22. Poser, supra note 2, at 575.
23. In addition, the rapid growth of option vehicles, which are high-commission, short-term
investments, further complicates matters. Option vehicles present a form of investment that is sus-
ceptible to churning (or perhaps a naturally higher rate of turnover that may disguise churning), but
not so amenable to traditional measures (including the turnover rate discussed in this Article) used
to determine the presence of excessive trading. For discussions of churning in options and the spe-
cial incentives in that context, see Packard, A Test for Churning in Stock Options, 4 CORP. L. REV.
222 (1981); Poser, supra note 2, at 576. These commentators suggest that economic differences and
complications with options require a different analysis of excessive trading than that used for other
investment accounts. See Packard, supra, at 232-44; Poser, supra note 2, at 607-08.
The SEC prefers the commission-equity ratio, which is the quotient of the amount of commis-
sions divided by the average equity. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., lST
SEss., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS 454-55 (Comm. Print 1978).
Because "commissions ostensibly are the most common motive for excessive trading .... they pro-
vide a basis for comparison of accounts using various investment vehicles, [and] the accounting
information necessary for this calculation is readily available in the industry." Id. This method of
detecting churning in the options context has been criticized as subject to undue variations, depend-
ing on strategy used, and thus would fail to sort cases accurately. Packard, supra, at 236-40.
Legal scholars have proposed alternatives to the SEC's commodity-equity ratio for dealing with
option churning. Packard proposes a "commission turnover rate," which involves a complicated
measurement designed to replace the turnover rate. Id. at 236-41. Professor Poser concludes that
1990]
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ing has worsened in this most recent period. The financial and legal communi-
ties have increased their attention on the churning problem. Complaints to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about unauthorized trading, which
often parallels churning, more than doubled from 1982 to 1984.24 The legal
industry press perceives that churning claims as well as other complaints against
brokers are "on the rise."'25 A prominent congressional leader has recently
voiced concern over "increasing numbers of complaints in connection with
churning and violations of suitability requirements."'26 This series of observa-
tions has been punctuated by the conclusion of leading securities scholars who
have noted that churning litigation appears to have been on the increase in the
last few years,27 an observation which confirms that inquiries into churning is-
sues are timely.
quantitative measures such as the turnover rate will not reveal whether there has been excessive
trading in options accounts:
Although the courts still require excessive trading as one of the elements of liability in
such cases, excessiveness apparently means little if anything more than that the broker has
entered into transactions inconsistent with the customer's investment objectives and finan-
cial needs, and that his conduct was inconsistent with his duty not to favor his own inter-
ests over those of his customer. . . . In view of the complexity and other special
characteristics of the options market, this definition of "excessive trading seems justified.
Statistical measurement of the trading is too blunt an instrument to determine whether or
not fraudulent activity has occurred in the intricate market for listed options.
Poser, supra note 2, at 606. Poser suggests a multistep inquiry, asking: I) what was the investment
strategy? 2) was that strategy consistent with the customer's financial needs and investment strategy?
3) was the customer able to understand the strategy and risks? and 4) did the broker minimize
commissions? Id. at 607-08. The model developed in this Article is not designed to detect excessive
trading in options.
Churning may also occur with respect to commodities accounts. Like options, however, com-
modities differ from other securities in that they are inherently short-term investments, highly sensi-
tive to market fluctuations, and bear commissions computed differently from other securities.
O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1893 n.55. Although commodity churning cases do present an issue of
excessive trading, courts do not seem ready to use turnover rates to the same degree as with invest-
ment accounts. See, e.g., Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Serv., 623 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (N.D.
Ill. 1985). The commission-to-equity ratio has taken some prominence in commodity churning
cases. See Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1985). This sort of analysis leads to
the exclusion of the turnover rate. See Lincolnwood Commodities, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] 2
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,986, at 28,247 (1984). One commentator has stated that those
quantitative measures are meaningless in the commodities context. See Lowe, Churning in the Com-
modity Futures Accounts, 5 CORP. L. REv. 322, 338 (1982). But it is also possible to find cases that
attribute significance to turnover rates under some circumstances. See, e.g., McBlaine v. Jack Carl
Assocs., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (turnover of account 8.5 times in roughly two
years adequately states excessive trading with respect to commodities options account that was set
up for customer seeking preservation of capital and long-term appreciation); Roche v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411, 1416-17 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (pleadings in commodity future trading account
required to include turnover ratio or percentage of account value paid in commissions where cus-
tomer alleged conservative investment goals) (citing Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1980)), and HARVARD Note, supra note 1, for the proposition that annual ratio in excess of
six is excessive).
24. Govoni, supra note 20, at 76.
25. See, e.g., Moss, Plaintiffs Going For Broke(r)-Investor Suits Against Stockbrokers on the
Increase, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 18.
26. Letter of Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations (Feb. 11, 1987), quoted in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 705 n.21 (2d ed, 1988); Pinto
& Poser, supra note 19, at 26, col. 3.
[Vol. 68
A MODEL FOR EXCESSIVE TRADING
III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CHURNING LIABILITY
A churning case may be based on either common-law or statutory grounds.
Numerous authorities support common-law rights of action for churning.28 In
addition, churning is prohibited expressly by rule 15cl-7,29 which was promul-
gated by the SEC under section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.30 But the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, such
as section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, 31 provide the most commonly used basis for
churning liability. 32 In practice, however, the application of these antifraud pro-
28. Fiduciary duty and constructive fraud concepts may provide rights of action under state
common law. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITES REGULATION 283 (1985) ("[Flacts amount-
ing to churning will generally be sufficient to state a companion claim under common law fraud.");
O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1882-84; Poser, supra note 2, at 576. For authorities supporting the viabil-
ity of a right of action for churning under such common law, see Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637
F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 686
P.2d 797, 800-01 (Colo. App. 1983), aff'd, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones &
Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 711-12, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 237-38 (1968); Pierce v. Richard
Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 773, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (1970); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 607-
08, 171 A.2d 381, 393 (1961).
29. Rule 15cl-7 states:
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as used in
section 15(c) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker, dealer or
municipal securities dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect
to which such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or his agent or employee is
vested with any discretionary power any transactions or purchase or sale which are exces-
sive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such account.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1988).
30. Section 15(c)(1) authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules to prohibit manipulative, deceptive
or fraudulent devices by brokers in effecting transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)(1) (1982); see T. HA-
ZEN, supra note 28, at 282-83; O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1884-85; Poser, supra note 2, at 576 n.33.
Rule 15cl-7, however, by its terms together with the limitation on authority given by the statute,
"applies only to churning of a discretionary account in transactions effected through the over-the-
counter market." O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1884; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)(1) (applies only to transac-
tions other than on a national exchange); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1988) (limited to discretionary
accounts); 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, § 2.4[a], at 2-18 (rule does not apply to "excessive trading
of securities listed on an exchange, in which the broker-dealer has membership" and "only in those
situations where discretionary authority has been expressly given to a broker by the investor, is it
technically proper to employ this particular rule"); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 930 (rule 15cl-7(a) ap-
plies "only where the customer has granted formal discretionary authority"). But see T. HAZEN,
supra note 28, at 282 ("account overall need not be formally discretionary," but "it must be shown
that the broker had 'control' over the account") (citing Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 890
(1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) and Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673
(9th Cir. 1982)). For further discussion of the control issue and the statements in Norris & Hirshberg
supporting a broader interpretation of the rule, see infra note 37.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Section 10(b) makes unlawful "in
connection with the purchase or sale of" a security the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe ......
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Rule lOb-5 makes unlawful, among other things, "any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud" or "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person," all "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
32. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1886; see, eg., Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384,
1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (violation of section 10(b)); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (violations of federal securities laws); Costello v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1367 (7th Cir. 1983) (case brought under section 10(b) and rule
1Ob-5); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (broker who
churns an account may be liable for violating section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5); Mihara v. Dean Witter
& Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1980) (broker may be liable for churning under rule lOb-5);
Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 368 (lst Cir. 1973) (violation of section 10(b) and
1990]
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visions has been somewhat limited in recent years by various Supreme Court
rulings. 33 As a result of these rulings many broker-churning cases will be arbi-
trated rather than tried before a court.
34
Although recent Supreme Court cases have imposed substantive require-
ments on private rights of action under rule lOb-5 such as "scienter" and "de-
ception,"'35 the legal standards adhered to by the lower federal courts have
rule l0b-5); Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(violation of section 10(b)). Churning also violates section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1884-85; Poser, supra note 2, at 576 n.33; see also Nunes v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 609 F. Supp. 1055, 1062-63 (D. Md. 1985) (recognizing private right of
action for churning under section 17(a)).
33. In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (arbitration agree-
ment enforceable under 1934 Act), and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S.
Ct. 1917, 1921-22 (1989) (arbitration agreement enforceable under 1933 Act), the Supreme Court
held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the federal securities laws were enforceable
and not subject to an exception to the United States Arbitration Act, which generally makes agree-
ments to arbitrate future conflicts specifically enforceable. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Brokers often
take advantage of arbitration by requiring their customers to sign a predispute arbitration agreement
when the investment account is opened. Courts have not been receptive to customers' claims that
these agreements are adhesive. See Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 361, 373-74 (1988) [hereinafter After McMahon]; cf. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public
Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 292 n.86 (1984) (discussing whether customers are
required to sign arbitration agreements). After McMahon and Rodriguez de QuUas, the tendency of
brokers to require such predispute agreements should result in panels of arbitrators hearing churning
cases as well as other federal securities claims against brokers under the 1933 and 1934 Acts in
increasing numbers. See Katsoris, After McMahon, supra, at 368-69.
34. Although many churning cases will be arbitrated because of these agreements, not all cases
will be forced into arbitration. See 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) No. 19, at 684 (May 12, 1989)
("only 39 percent of cash accounts contain mandatory arbitration clauses") (relating comments by
SEC Commissioner Grundfest). Moreover, even in arbitration some measure of excessive trading
activity is necessary to analyze even arbitrated claims. The turnover rate is one measure that is used
for that purpose in securities arbitration. P. HOBLIN, SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 9-17 to -22 (1988).
35. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-77 (1977) (rule lob-5 prohibits decep-
tion, not unfairness); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (negligence not sufficient
to support rule lOb-5 action); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975)
(purchaser or seller status required for standing under rule 10b-5); see also T. HAZEN, supra note 28,
at 445 ("Although several recent Supreme Court cases have limited the scope of the lob-5 private
right of action, it continues to flourish."); 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAID &
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 5.7(400) (1988) (citing cases). In particular, lower courts find the requisite
"deception" in the violation of the broker's fiduciary duty to the customer and the requisite scienter
in the act of consciously overtrading. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir.
1983) ("Churning, in and of itself, may be a deceptive and manipulative device under section 10(b),
the scienter required by section 10(b) being implicit in the nature of the conduct."); Costello v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) ("As a scheme, the essence of which is
deception of a relying customer,... churning, as a matter of law, is considered a violation of section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 .. "); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The
churning of a client's account is, in itself, a scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of Rule
lOb-5."); In re Catenella & E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1405-07 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (despite
Santa Fe's requirement of deception, churning claims do state a cause of action under rule lOb-5);
Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 91 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (churning is deceptive under
rule lOb-5). One might believe that grounding such cases on section 10(b) violates the spirit, if not
the holding of Santa Fe, regardless of what the lower courts say on the matter. Of course, the line
between fraud and breach of fiduciary duty is not always sharp, especially in this context. See
Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. Rv. 1247, 1280-83 (churn-
ing is the best example of fiduciary misconduct amounting to fraud) (1983).
The duty of a broker "to refrain from overtrading arises from the ubiquitous shingle theory."
Jacobs, supra note 6, at 930 (1972). The "shingle theory," which was developed by the SEC, has
been described as holding that by "hanging out his shingle," a broker gives an implied warranty that
he will treat his customers fairly and honestly. See Kahn v. S.E.C., 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961);
L. Loss, supra note 27, at 811-20; Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The
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remained essentially unchanged. Three elements are necessary to establish
churning: 1) control of the account by the broker; 2) excessive trading in light of
the customer's objectives; and 3) scienter, which is defined as intent to defraud,
or a reckless disregard by the broker of the customer's best interests.
36
Each of the three elements of the churning cause of action possesses its own
analytical difficulties.3 7 Yet, the "excessive trading" element, while clearly rec-
ognized as a necessary element of a churning case,38 has been perhaps the most
troublesome for the courts to evaluate. In theory, a court must determine
"whether the volume and frequency of transactions, considered in light of the
nature of the account and the situation, needs and objectives of the customer,
have been so 'excessive' as to indicate a purpose of the broker to derive profit for
Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 691,
702-03 (1964); HARVARD Note, supra note I, at 870; cf. T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 274 (under
shingle theory broker impliedly represents that he has adequate information about the security; in-
terpretation of the implied warranty as extending to the soundness of the representations about the
stock's value "is too strong a statement of the rule"); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIEs REGULATION
502-505 (1986) (some aspects of shingle theory may no longer be viable in light of Santa Fe). That
"implied warranty" is violated when the broker chums or overtrades a customer account.
36. M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 795
F.2d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 1986).
37. For example, it has been noted that the "control" element has been particularly trouble-
some. See O'Hara, supra note 4, at 1890 (defining control has been a "veritable nightmare for the
courts"). Control most clearly exists when the broker is given discretionary power over the cus-
tomer account. If the broker is not the decisionmaker, however, control can also exist in the more
difficult cases as de facto control over a nondiscretionary account, the context of many churning
cases. I S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-22 to -23; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 930 (control can be
indirect); see Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987) ("control,
though not formal, may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances"); Bowley v. Stotler & Co.,
751 F.2d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 1985) (nondiscretionary account may be under broker's de facto control;
determinative factor not label, but identity of person making trading decisions); Mihara, 619 F.2d at
821 (nondiscretionary account may be under de facto control of broker); In re Catanella & E.F.
Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. at 1406 n.25 (level of control depends upon various factors); Newburger,
Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (control not determined by label on
account but by identity of decisionmaker), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977). It has been sug-
gested that this difficult issue should be resolved by asking whether the customer relied on the bro-
ker. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1933-36; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 930-31 ("de facto discretionary
account is created ... when an investor evidences trust and confidence in his broker by regularly
following his advice"). Long ago the SEC, in discussing rule 15ci-7, stated:
[I]n our view, the handling of a customer's account may become fraudulent whenever the
broker or dealer is in a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by
reason of the customer's willingness to follow the suggestions of the broker or dealer and
he abuses the customers [sic] confidence by overtrading.
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 890 (1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also
Bowley, 751 F.2d at 648-49 ("touchstone is whether or not the customer has sufficient intelligence
and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations and to reject one when he thinks it
unsuitable"); Follansbee v. Davis, Skagg & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Mihara,
619 F.2d at 821 ("requisite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows the recommen-
dations of the broker"). For discussions of the difficulties associated with the elements other than
excessive trading, see Langevoort, supra note 35 (discussing the intent to defraud element in light of
the deception requirement of Santa Fe); O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1899-931 (exhaustive discussion of
the confusion relating to the control element); FORDHAM Note, supra note 1, at 1104 (discussing
confusion over the separation between the excessive trading element and the element relating to the
broker's intent).
38. See, e.g., Hotmar, 808 F.2d at 1385; Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
767 F.2d 1498, 1501 (1lth Cir. 1985); Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d
523, 529 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2846 (1988); Mihara, 619 F.2d at 820-21.
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himself while disregarding the interests of the customer."'3 9 A broker's over-
trading of a customer account to garner commissions is the essence of churn-
ing,4° and it is the direct cause of the injury to the investor. At some point the
degree of activity in an account alone should be sufficient to prove churning.
41
In the typical case, however, it is difficult to determine whether excessive
trading has occurred. This difficulty derives from the highly factual nature of
the inquiry, which precludes the development of a fixed rule or formula.42 The
lack of coherent guidelines for using turnover rates to analyze the excessive trad-
ing element raises concern about the effectiveness of current methods. The ex-
cessive trading standard involves an in-depth probe into the relationship between
the amount of trading activity and the customer's investment objectives. Such
an inquiry necessitates an evaluation of the relationship between a qualitative
characteristic (investor objectives) and a quantitative measurement (trading
activity).
The investor's qualitative individual objectives generally set the standard in
any churning case. Different investors desire diverse financial risks and returns
and therefore utilize a rich variety of investment vehicles such as bonds, blue-
chip stocks, speculative stocks, and options. For example, courts generally ac-
cept the proposition that the frequency of trades for a speculator naturally might
exceed that for a person desiring a low-risk investment strategy and preservation
of initial capital invested. 43 Thus, courts will look generally at what the individ-
39. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd and modi-
fied, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); see also McQuesten v. Advest, Inc,, [1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,011, at 90,721 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 1988) ("trading . . . so excessive as to indicate a
purpose on the part of the broker to derive a profit for himself at the expense of his customer");
Darrell v. Goodson, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,349, at 97,326 (S.D.NY.
1980) ("excessive amount of trading by a broker-dealer in a client's account in light of its size and
purpose, for the sole purpose of generating commission income"); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C.
163, 165 (1947) (turnover "excessive in light of surrounding circumstances, and ... [was] induced
solely for the purpose of obtaining profits" for the broker).
40. Poser, supra note 2, at 577 ("gravamen of a churning claim is... the overall amount of
trading which is excessive in view of the size and character of the account"); id. at 582 ("crux of a
traditional churning charge is that the trading was excessive"); see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d
1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974) ("aggregation of transactions excessive in number and effect.., consti-
tutes the gravamen of the complaint"); cf O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1899 (broker's "[a]buse of...
control [over account] is the gravamen of a churning offense").
41. See Poser, supra note 2, at 572. Professor Poser states:
The amount of trading in the customer's account, which gives the churning offense its
name, is relevant only because an excessive amount of trading creates an inference that the
broker has disregarded his customer's interests in order to gain commissions for himself,
thereby acting fraudulently to the customer. In cases involving.trading in shares of stock,
this inference is often justified simply on the basis of the amount of trading in the account.
Id. at 572.
42. See Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1985) (question of fact; no precise
rule or formula); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (same);
Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 435 (same); Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, NASD Sec. Dealers Manual
(CCH) 2152 (Board of Governors policy; no specific standard for churning); FORDHAM Note,
supra note 1, at 1101 ("no single formula for showing that an account has been traded excessively").
43. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (aggressive or
speculative goals facilitate finding that trading not excessive); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681
F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982) (trading deemed not excessive for investor looking for short-term
profits). For additional authorities and discussion of the anticipated increase in trading activity for
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ual investor was trying to achieve.44 In addition, under the general formulation
of the excessive trading concept, as described above, other qualitative factors
such as the customer's financial resources further complicate the decision. One
obvious example is the investor with limited resources, a situation that generally
suggests that a reduction in trading activity is appropriate.4 5 Consequently, any
hope for the use of a uniform standard is unrealistic.
After examining the qualitative base of investor objectives, courts often rely
upon a variety of more objective factors, often quantitative measurements, to
determine the existence of excessive trading. These factors typically include
high account turnover, in-and-out trading,46 and hefty broker commissions.47
The leading authorities seem to agree that the foremost quantitative mea-
sure is the turnover rate or ratio.48 Indeed some decisions, including recent
trading and speculative accounts as compared to investment accounts, see infra text and accompany-
ing notes 131-35.
44. For an analysis of the customer's investment goals, see Costello, 711 F.2d at 1363, 1368
("investment objectives were not unduly ambitious" because of customer's desire to "earn a high
return on his money," apparently about 20%, but customer was "primarily concerned with preserv-
ing principal," suggesting that lower level of activity was justified); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814, 817, 819, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1980) (investor's concern about possible layoffs in future
and education of children and their financial security apparent interest in growth, together with an
average annual turnover rate of 5.59 and 9.3 times in 1971, held to be sufficient evidence of excessive
trading); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 435-37 (trading accounts generally show greater activity but individ-
ual circumstances and needs of investor, who in this case was a retired widow without full knowl-
edge of the markets, may justify a lower level of activity).
45. See, eg., McQuesten v. Advest, Inc., [1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,011, at 90,722
(D. Mass. Aug. 4, 1988) (limited financial resources of investor can be considered by jury to justify a
lower turnover rate for a nominal trading account).
46. "In-and-out trading" is "a sale of all or part of the customer's portfolio with the proceeds
immediately reinvested in other securities followed in a short period by the sale of the newly ac-
quired securities." Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 435.
47. See, eg., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) ("hallmarks [of churning] are
disproportionate turnover of the account, frequent in-and-out trading, and large brokerage commis-
sions"); Poser, supra note 4, at 582 (same). For a set of concise descriptions of these several meas-
ures, see FORDHAM Note, supra note 1, at 1102 n.9. The latter authority contends that only the
three measures mentioned above can be used as aggregate measures of excessive trading. Id. at 1109
& n.51.
48. 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 35, § 5.7, at 5:82.104 (turnover rate is "most
commonly used analytical tool" for determining excessive trading); 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14,
at 2-44 ("single most material fact in a churning case is the computation of the annualized turnover
rate"); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 933 ("most important statistical test in excessive trading opinions is
turnover in the account"); O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1891 ("most important test [for overtrading in
churning] cases is turnover ratio"); Poser, supra note 2, at 582, 599 ("most frequently used measure
of excessiveness in churning cases involving stock trading is the turnover rate").
Other measures do not attract quite this degree of enthusiasm. Costello, 711 F.2d at 1369 n.9.
In-and-out trading, for example, see supra note 46, is difficult to match with legitimate investment
objectives. HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 876. It has been observed that the pattern of in-and-out
trading is a "key indicator" of excessive trading, where such a pattern exists. Poser, supra note 2, at
582-83.
Some cases accord percentage of account value paid in commissions status equal to turnover
rate as far as the pleading requirement is concerned. See, e.g., Baselski v. Paine Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, 514 F. Supp. 535, 541 (N.D. Ill. 1981). This information is relevant "because the nub of the
offense in overtrading consists of taking repeated profits on a number of transactions conferring no
advantage upon the customer." HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 877. Nevertheless, one of the
leading authorities has concluded that the amount of the commissions earned is a "secondary consid-
eration" with no "meaningful guidelines from the cases." Poser, supra note 2, at 582-83. The lesser
dependence on such a measure seems understandable in light of the relative directness with which
the turnover rate measures whether the trading has been too active for an account.
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ones, have held that a churning count fails to state a claim unless it includes the
turnover rate or other quantitative measure or facts sufficient to compute
them.49 Authorities in this vein have included'some indication that an allega-
tion will be found inadequate to withstand a motion to dismiss if the alleged
turnover rate is too low.50
The turnover rate for any particular period is the ratio of the total cost of
securities purchased to the net amount invested.5 1 To borrow a simple example
used by a leading authority, "if the purchases during a twelve-month period
totalled $1 million and the average equity in the account was $50 thousand, the
annual turnover rate would be twenty."' 52 It gives the court an idea of the fre-
quency with which the securities in the account have been traded for new securi-
49. See Franks v. Cavanaugh, 711 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (1989) (complaint did not adequatelyallege churning without annual turnover rate); Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Ray, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("complaint ... must set forth ... facts sufficient to permit thecalculation of the turnover rate of the account and/or the percentage of the account value paid incommissions"); Hecklin v. Weatherly Sec. Corp., No. 88-6736 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (complaint dismissed because it lacked inter alia an allegation of turnover
rate).
50. See Siegel, 658 F. Supp. at 554 (complaint dismissed because turnover rate of two for ac-count with alleged conservative investment objectives was deemed too low to allege churning absentallegations of other special circumstances); Hempel v. Blunt, Ellis and Loewi, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 313,317-18 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (turnover of at most two for eight months was too low to maintain anaction for churning). Some higher turnover rates may state a claim. See Darrell v. Goodson, [1980Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,349, at 97,324-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (annual turnoverrates of 1.94, 8.30, 4.2, 4.8, and 5.9 "certainly set out a prima facie case of excessive trading" in acase in which plaintiffs alleged that account was to be managed in a "conservative and prudent
manner, with an emphasis on capital preservation").
51. See I S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-44; O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1891; Poser, supra note2, at 582; HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 875; see also Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 255 n.2 (4thCir. 1975); Costello, 711 F.2d at 1369 n.l1. In the form of an equation, one variation of the annual-
ized turnover rate (ATR) would appear as:
P 365
AT.R - X -
E D
P = total cost of purchases in period
E = average net equity in the account in period
D = number of days in the period
We should note here that the numerator of "purchases" would approximate "sales." See I S,
GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-61 ("fairly stated (as a rough rule of thumb) that the total transac-
tions amount to twice the volume of only the total purchases").
This measure has been computed in a variety of ways. 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 11, at 9-125 to-129; HARVARD Note, supra note I, at 875. One version is sometimes referred to as the Looper
formula. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., Isr SEss. 451 (Comm. Print 1979). The namederives from Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294 (1958), which stated: "The turnover rate is computed bydividing the cost of the purchases by the average investment, the latter representing the cumulative
total of the net investment in the account at the end of each month, exclusive of loans, divided by thenumber of months under consideration." Id. at 297 n.6. This version of the turnover ratio can resultin much different figures than the turnover ratio as defined by Goldberg, due to differences regardingthe treatment of securities deposited and margin debt. See P. HoBLIN, supra note 34, at 9-17 to -22.
Conclusions relating to our data are not intended to resolve such issues as may result in anoma-lous figures. We attempt only to put the simplest rates in perspective. The study of and choiceamong alternative versions of calculating rates are beyond the scope of this Article.
52. Poser, supra note 2, at 582.
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ties on the recommendation of the broker.5 3
Some authorities, given such a quantitative measure as the turnover rate,
have attempted to draw some rather firm guidelines about what turnover rate
sufficiently indicates excessive trading. For example, one leading scholarly piece
in the Harvard Law Review 54 has been cited with favor by numerous courts for
its conclusion that an annual turnover rate greater than six (entire account
turned over every two months) is likely to be excessive. 5 The annual turnover
figure of six has taken on independent significance in some courts, which now
routinely parrot the observation of that early authority without expressly recog-
nizing its origin.5 6 Indeed, the guideline relating to the figure of six also has now
been read by some courts to raise a negative inference for turnovers of less than
six. 57 This acceptance of the magical number of six is remarkable in light of the
failure of any of its advocates to suggest a reason for fixing upon it.
Yet another authority has purported to discern in the cases a 2-4-6 "rule"
as a measure of excessive trading.58 Under this rule, an annual turnover rate
that exceeds two indicates a possibility of churning; a rate in excess of four cre-
ates a presumption of churning; and a rate in excess of six conclusively estab-
lishes churning.5 9 This authority bolsters that conclusion as to its threshold
figure by noting that when the ratio is two with a two percent commission rate,
the total commissions would amount to eight percent, which would significantly
diminish investor returns.60 These observations should have substantial force
for accounts with conservative investment goals and thus lower returns. This set
of guidelines seems to be an attempt to explain how the original suggestion by
53. See Costello, 711 F.2d at 1369 n.11.
54. HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 876.
55. Poser, supra note 2, at 582 (HARVARD Note has been frequently cited by the courts for this
proposition); eg., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); Van Alen v.
Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.
1977); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part
and modified, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
56. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("courts... have indicated that an annual turnover rate of six reflects excessive trading");
Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (D. Mass. 1982) (annual turnover rate in excess of six
adequately alleges churning) (citing Mihara rather than HARVARD Note); Prodex, Inc. v. Legg Ma-
son Wood Walker, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,238, at 96,145 n.13
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (same); Franks v. Cavanaugh, 711 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (1989) (excessive trading
element of churning generally assumed from an annual turnover rate in excess of six). Thus, one of
the leading authorities has stated: "Although the damaging turn-over rate must necessarily be de-
cided on a case by case basis, it appears that a given account's annual turn-over rate in excess of six
times is considered generally to reflect excessive trading." T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 284.
57. See Hempel v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 313, 317 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Siegel v.
Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 550, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and modified, 570 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
58. 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, § 2.9[b][1], at 2-43 to -50. This formulation of excessive
trading standards was subsequently adopted verbatim by a securities lawyer writing for brokers.
Ferentz, Churning, The Legal Lowdown, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, June 1983, at 22, 25.
59. 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-43 to -44.
60. Id. at 2-61 to -62. That authority was written over a decade ago and in that time period
trading costs have declined and portfolio turnover in general has naturally increased somewhat. See
Berkowitz & Logue, The Portfolio Turnover Explosion Explored, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. Spring 1987,
at 38, 38-39.
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the Harvard Law Review Note would work for annual turnover rates at less than
six, without reading that standard as having a strong negative inference for such
lower rates. But again, no substantial financial' reasons are given for the set of
suggested guidelines.
Although bright-line rules would provide an alluring solution to a thorny
problem, such suggestions are unrealistic. Reliance by the courts solely on uni-
form numerical guides has two major shortcomings. First, the sweeping gener-
ality of these tests ignores differences between the objectives of investors, a factor
clearly relevant in assessing churning claims, because the excessiveness of a
given turnover rate depends on those objectives and the nature of the account.
61
Accordingly, despite the frequent statements of quantitative standards, the
court decisions have been all over the map in terms of actual conclusions
reached regarding particular turnover rates. One can find decisions that, in
terms of results reached, are consistent with, or close to consistent with, rules
such as the 2-4-6 rule and the more general magical figure of six. 62 Neverthe-
less, some courts have also concluded that high turnover rates did not constitute
churning in the cases before them63 and others have held that some apparently
61. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 n.ll (7th Cir. 1983) ("Whether a
particular turnover rate is excessive depends on the objectives of the customer."); O'Hara, supra note
2, at 1891 & n.51 ("Excessiveness ... must ultimately be measured against the nature of the account
and the investment objectives of the customer."). For a discussion of the relevance of the investor's
objectives, see supra text accompanying notes 42-45; see also 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-41
("there is no such thing as excessive trading per se"); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 932 ("No mathematical
formula can establish a volume of trading which per se violates the Rule [10b-5] since an overriding
subjective consideration-the customer's needs and resources-must be superimposed on the objec-
tive factors."); O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1891 ("Because determination of an excessive turnover rate
depends on the nature of the account and the circumstances of the investor, it is impossible to state
definitively how many times an account must be turned over during a given period before trading
will be deemed excessive."); Poser, supra note 2, at 582 ("there is no litmus-paper test to indicate
what turnover rate is excessive," because the customer's individual situation and objectives must be
considered).
62. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1501-02
(11 th Cir. 1985) (expert testimony of an annualized turnover rate of eight sufficient for jury to find
excessive trading when even though plaintiff entered into an options trading account his financial
status and expert testimony regarding the lack of justification for the velocity of trading suggested
decreased activity appropriate); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 817-19 (9th Cir. 1980)
(annualized turnover rate of 9.3 excessive when investor sought growth but also financial security
and funds for children's education); Cruse v. Equitable Sec., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (S.D.N.Y,
1987) (annualized turnover rate of 32 states claim of churning in light of conservative goals); Siegel
v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (annualized turnover
rate of two fails to allege churning absent other allegations, despite allegations of conservative invest-
ment objectives; motion to dismiss granted); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp.
1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (annualized rate of 1.85 not excessive under circumstances when cus-
tomer expected that objective was trading instead of long-term investment), affd in part and modi-
fied, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick,
Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (annualized turnover rate of three not excessive in light
of customer's intent to build up her account), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977); Gleit v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,799, at 90,886-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (turnover of 2.97 not excessive when account was for growth and securities bought
were appropriate for this purpose); cf. Marshak v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377,
380 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (rate of 1.226 over life of account not clearly excessive).
63. See, eg., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (annualized
rate of about seven not excessive for speculative investor); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453,
458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (allegations of annualized turnover rate of 1.44 not sufficient for summary
judgment in absence of proof of nature of account and relationship of parties).
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low rates were excessive. 64 Although some express deference is apparently given
to the figure of six, one can read the decisions without a comfortable understand-
ing of a systematic relationship between turnover rates and normal investment
objectives.
Without more, this state of affairs merely suggests great uncertainty regard-
ing what constitutes an excessively high rate of trading and tentativeness in the
use of the turnover rate. At best then, standards, such as the magical figure of
six and the 2-4-6 rule, would seem to be only rough rules of thumb. They make
the determination of excessive trading deceptively simple by avoiding the often
difficult evaluation of the effect of investor objectives. The appropriate grada-
tions within the range of turnover rates for diverse investment objectives remain
elusive. Moreover, given the absence of analysis supporting such figures, one
may legitimately wonder whether they were simply seized upon as numbers of
sufficient size to indicate excessive trading regardless of the investment goals.
This type of impressionistic 65 approach points to a second, broader problem
with turnover ratio analysis-the absence of any foundation in financial theory.
The rough rules suggested in the cases may be grossly and generally inaccurate
in light of the financial evidence of appropriate turnover rates. They may in fact
be inaccurate for any category of investment account. Because investor objec-
tives are relevant, the legal rules proposed and used by previously referenced
authorities seem grounded on an arbitrary line drawing, which may not be ap-
propriate for this complex issue.
This Article attempts to ascertain a systematic relationship between the
quantitative annual turnover rate and the qualitative objectives of the individual
investor. By studying the turnover rates for mutual funds with diverse invest-
ment objectives, it should be possible to develop a relationship between the turn-
over rate and investor objectives that is superior to that suggested by the
authorities described in the preceding paragraphs. This study attempts to ap-
proximate ranges of acceptable turnover rates for different objectives, and ac-
ceptable turnover rates for average investor's objectives, even if one is not
comfortable making the fine distinctions required to establish gradations by type
64. See, eg., Jenny v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
96,568, at 94,382 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (turnover rate of 1.84 not safe as matter of law when nature of
account and objectives were in dispute); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842
(E.D. Va. 1968) (annualized rate of two plus clearly excessive for investment account of unsophisti-
cated plaintiff); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (annualized
rate of less than 2 excessive for retired widow even though she acquiesced in trading strategy as
opposed to long term investment), aff'd and modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); J. Logan &
Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 95 (1962) (several annualized turnover rates of less than two excessive for various
unsophisticated and vulnerable investors with somewhat limited resources); First Sec. Corp., 40
S.E.C. 589, 590-91 (1961) (annualized turnover rate of about 1.7 excessive when customer was sub-
stantially dependent on the income from the account and generally uninformed, rendering inappro-
priate treatment of the account as a trading account; conservation of principal and receipt of
dividends were of primary importance); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947) (annualized
turnover of about 1.5 excessive for investment account of widows).
65. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 932-33 ("Typically a court or the Commission will recite a
series of numbers and ratios and then decide, based on a subjective impression of the facts, whether
or not a broker is guilty of churning."); HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 874 ("likely that an overall
impressionistic view will be taken of the dealings in the account in light of its character").
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of account. In any event, we should have an improved sensitivity to the point at
which excessive trading generally occurs.
The next sections lay the groundwork for the study of pertinent portions of
modem finance theory, and then describe observations from a study of turnover
rates in mutual funds in order to define more fully the relationship between in-
vestment objectives and turnover rates.
IV. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
Investments obviously involve elements of both return and risk. An indi-
vidual investor's objectives depend upon the level of risk and return desired. In
order to believe it possible to associate investment objectives with turnover rates,
one must have reason to believe that accounts sharing similar investment goals
will also share similar levels of trading activity. Courts seem to accept this prop-
osition broadly by their statements, such as those to the effect that speculative or
trading accounts should experience higher turnover than conservative accounts.
To some extent "common sense" observations support this view that objectives
should influence turnover rates.
Nevertheless, a reason that goes beyond the intuitive response is provided
by modern portfolio theory and the concept of the efficient set or frontier. In the
efficient frontier the expected rate of return is associated with a level of risk (or
variance) for a given portfolio of investments. 66 The efficient set is "the set of
mean-variance choices from the investment opportunity set where for a given
variance ... no investment opportunity offers a higher mean return." 67 The
points lying on the efficient frontier represent the portfolios that would maxi-
mize utility for different investors; investors with different preferences for risk
and return would choose different points on the frontier.
The concept of the efficient frontier provides an application of the general
relationship of risk and return in the context of a particular kind of investment:
a portfolio of investments. For any given investment choice, an investor or a
professional adviser generally must weigh the potential for greater returns
against greater risks. A project offering greater returns may be rejected because
it also subjects the invested capital to an unacceptably higher level of risk.
68
As these concepts would be applied to a portfolio of investments using the
efficient frontier concepts, a rational investor, and the broker handling the ac-
count, would always seek to invest in a portfolio that lies on the efficient set and
66. For standard finance authorities providing additional information on modem portfolio the-
ory, see T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY & CORPORATE POLIcY 163-66 (2d ed,
1983); Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, FIN.
ANAL. J., Mar.-Apr. 1974, 68-80, May-June 1974, 69-85.
67. T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, supra note 66, at 165. These parameters are commonly ex-
pressed as the expected or mean value for returns and the distribution or dispersion about that value
for risk. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 58 (3d ed. 1987). The latter
element may be expressed in terms of either variance or standard deviation, which basically is a
statistical concept designed to quantify how far from the average the figures in the population or
sample are spread or distributed. Id. at 65.
68. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 67, at 58.
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would avoid portfolios that offer a lower rate of return for the desired level of
risk.69 Thus, each investor would select from the efficient set the single portfolio
or point on the efficient set that matches the investor's subjective tradeoff be-
tween risk and return. Given a different objective, each would select a unique
point on the fiontier; different objectives would lead to different mixtures of
investments.
In the everchanging marketplace, the maintenance of a position on the effi-
cient frontier implies, if not requires, an optimum turnover ratio.7 0 Because
transaction costs (commissions) are a direct cost to the investor and are a func-
tion of turnover, they directly affect the return that a portfolio will generate.
Any transaction costs that are in excess of the minimum amount necessary to
maintain a portfolio at a given point on the efficient frontier will reduce the
investor's return, yet will not reduce the risk involved.7 1 Therefore, one should
expect that portfolios managed to lie on the efficient frontier will experience
particular turnover rates.
V. USE OF MUTUAL FUNDS AS REFERENCE POINTS
For our purposes, the existence of the efficient set theory shows that one
69. W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 20-33 (1970).
70. One might argue that because of the portfolio separation theorem the optimum portfolio for
an investment objective does not change over time, as it is essentially the market portfolio combined
with an optimal rate of lending or borrowing. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE FINANCE 158 (3d ed. 1988); see generally Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward
Risk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958) (discussing relationship of demand for cash to interest rate).
It may be that there is in fact no informational advantage, the market portfolio is most efficient,
and for that reason "many professional investors invest in a market-index portfolio and ... most
others hold well-diversified portfolios." R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra, at 158. Of course, such
authorities describing the separation theorem assume that everyone has the same information and
that the optimum portfolio for everyone is the market portfolio. If these assumptions are right, it
seems that there would not be distinct portfolios on the efficient frontier because everyone should
hold the market portfolio. Under this theorem, turnover without changing information would be
much lower than the mutual fund data discussed below (on the order of five to ten percent for large
passive funds to account for inflows and outflows such as dividends), and it will not increase much
with changing expectations, which might arguably be used as an excuse for increasing turnover. If,
and only if, the separation theorem holds (a proposition highly doubted by the financial community)
this raises several related issues that are difficult to discuss separately.
First, given the unquestionably changing economy and technology, as well as the state of an
investment manager's knowledge, it seems counterintuitive and unrealistic to conclude that a portfo-
lio should remain static except for inflows and outflows. Second, professional money managers oper-
ating either as mutual fund advisers or brokers obviously believe both that information changes and
that they have some informational advantage over other investors; otherwise all of them would hold
the market portfolio. Money managers do not all hold the same market portfolio, so they must
perceive some advantage in the differences. The assumptions of the separation theory do not appear
to be well founded.
Moreover, we do not wish to undertake the further and more difficult task of proving not only
that brokers overtrade more frequently than the courts admit, but that mutual fund managers as a
whole are guilty of similar misconduct. The presence of an adequate motive for overtrading would
seem to be necessary before we make such a general accusation. It may be that some such argument
could be developed, but for now we endeavor merely to show that the apparently low rates of turno-
ver in mutual funds suggest that some brokers trade too often. For us this is a simple matter of
observation from an acceptable control group (mutual funds) and comparison of that data to stated
legal principles. The path is open to someone else to write a revolutionary finance article in this
subject.
71. T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, supra note 66, at 12.
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should expect a systematic relationship in the tradeoff between risk and return in
determining the optimal portfolios for various investors with diverse objectives.
However, direct use of efficient set theory to determine the presence of excessive
trading presents great difficulties, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
72
Therefore, in order to estimate optimal turnover rates, we will use a study of a
sample of mutual funds as a surrogate to overcome the difficulties with direct use
of the efficient set theory.
Observing turnover rates for a sample of mutual funds with diverse, specific
investment objectives provides a good opportunity to obtain data that approxi-
mates the location of points on the efficient frontier. While the use of mutual
funds is an imperfect comparison, 73 it is an informative source untapped for its
full potential.74 At the very least, the turnover rates for mutual funds are repre-
sentative of portfolios that lie within the efficient frontier, and, assuming that the
mutual fund managers pursue the stated goals of the funds, the points will tend
toward that frontier. Furthermore, mutual fund managers, unlike commission-
rewarded brokers, lack the incentive to overtrade, and therefore serve as a natu-
ral test group, potentially associating optimum turnover rates with various in-
vestment objectives.
A. Reasons to Believe that Mutual Funds Can Serve as Proxies
Several good reasons support the proposition that the turnover rates of mu-
tual funds will approximate the optimum turnover rates for broker-managed in-
vestment accounts. First, the managers of mutual funds are professionals
making investment decisions designed to maximize return for a given level of
risk. One should expect that brokers strive to maintain a position on the efficient
72. The efficient set can be determined if we know the expected return, the expected risk, and
the covariance of returns among available investment instruments. The covariance is a measure of
the way in which two variables move in relation to each other. See T. COPELAND & J. WESTON,
supra note 66, at 153. There are obvious difficulties and uncertainties in predicting or estimating
returns and risks associated with each security. See W. SHARPE, supra note 69, at 20-33 (securities
analysis is an art and requires predictions about the future prospects of securities). In addition, as
the number of investment instruments increases, determination of the efficient set becomes a problem
of computation.
Any direct application of the efficient set theory to determine churning is further complicated
by the required demonstration that the securities chosen by the broker lie on the efficient frontier.
Furthermore, securities comprising the set can change, thus requiring certain securities to be re-
placed by other securities. It is this activity, caeteris paribus, with which we are concerned.
73. As noted below, some flaws do exist in the comparison of turnover rates for mutual funds
and broker-managed accounts. In addition, difficulty exists in accurately matching investor objec-
tives with the appropriate reference point for mutual fund accounts.
74. To some extent, H.A. Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624 (D. Minn. 1988), is an
exception to this statement. The plaintiffs, administrators of a profit sharing plan, introduced evi-
dence of the turnover ratios of 22 mutual funds recommended by the defendant in the time period in
question. The court found the 16 "growth and current income" funds to match the conservative
investment objectives of the plaintiffs most closely and to yield annual turnover rates of 0.296, 0.368
and 0.358. Id. at 630. The court concluded that the turnover rate of 4.12 for the account was
excessive. Id. at 630-32.
The Dasler court did not state how the information from mutual funds should be used, beyond
the obvious comparison. Our data indicate a substantially higher rate of turnover for the type of
mutual fund considered (0.53), even though our findings relating to the distribution of that type of
fund suggest the same conclusion-that the account was overtraded.
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frontier by purchasing and selling securities in accordance with the funds' over-
all investment criteria.75 Indeed, mutual funds do have the characteristics that
make them capable of serving as valid proxies for the generic investor because
they reflect a range of investment goals, and mutual fund managers generally
strive for these goals.76 Second, the compensation of the investment adviser of a
mutual fund is more closely tied to investment performance than trading activ-
ity, which determines a broker's compensation. 7 7 Thus, there are reasons to
believe that the turnover rates evidenced in mutual funds represent a respectable
estimate of the level of turnover that professional managers regard as
optimum.
78
Arguments against using mutual funds as reference points to estimate opti-
mal turnover rates for broker managed accounts are not wholly persuasive, even
if they should be recognized. First, one might argue that mutual funds should
experience less turnover than individual investment accounts with smaller
amounts invested. A smaller dollar-valued account might necessitate greater
turnover because adequate diversification might not be possible to protect the
investor from market changes. But the large size of the investment accounts
frequently at issue in the reported cases (account size in hundreds of thousands
of dollars) suggests that this factor should not automatically and completely
disqualify mutual funds as a proxy.7 9 Even cases involving smaller investment
75. One might argue that any given mutual fund may not trade optimally because of inept
management. The market for human capital is generally long-run efficient. See R. EKELUND & R.
TOLLISON, ECONOMIcS 311-16 (2d ed. 1988). Given that assumption, the inept management would
be replaced.
Similarly, some mutual funds may be so large that the size of their holdings present liquidity
problems and they may trade at less than the optimum level. Our study minimizes these problems,
because the turnover rates for our sample funds are given equal weight regardless of size. Moreover,
such a possibility implies less than optimal behavior by the larger funds, and such a risk exists in any
empirical study.
76. See Martin, Keown & Farrell, Do Fund Objectives Affect Diversification Policies?, 8 J. PORT-
FOLIO MGMT. 19 (1982) (actual investment actions followed by mutual fund managers significantly
influenced by stated investment goals of funds); McDonald, Objectives and Performance of Mutual
Funds, 1960-1969, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 311, 331 (June 1974) (concluding for mutual
funds that "stated objectives were significantly related to subsequent measures of systematic risk and
total variability and to realized mean excess returns").
77. See generally STAFF OF THE NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, STOcKS BONDS OP-
TIONS FUTURES-INVESTMENTS AND THEIR MARKETS 134 (1989) ("money manager's fee is usu-
ally based on a percentage of the total market value of the entire fund"); Note, Shareholder Actions
Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers: Placing Limits on the Demand Requirement, 50 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 807, 808 (1984) ("fee generally calculated as a percentage of the fund's net assets").
78. We do not argue that managers of mutual funds never trade excessively. Some cases do
suggest that investment advisers or fund managers may overtrade. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699
F.2d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 1983); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 605-06, 171 A.2d 381, 394 (1961); First
Multifund of Am., 44 S.E.C. 680, 687 (1971) (fund with portfolio turnover rate of 2.531 for 1969
compared to .768 for 1968). We contend only that generally the incentives to do so are less compel-
ling than for commission-compensated brokers managing individual investment accounts. This point
is supported by a leading authority. See Poser, supra note 2, at 577 n.38.
79. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1364 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Costello
placed a total of $235,384.65 with Oppenheimer"); Cruse v. Equitable Sec., 678 F. Supp. 1023, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (account value of $160,000); M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106,
1108 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (total initial deposit of $1.6 million), aff'd, 795 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986);
Grove v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 99,229
(S.D. Fla. 1983) ("invested capital of $158,000"); Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F.
Supp. 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (total value of account for period in question was approximately
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accounts with values in the lower tens of thousands of dollars seem to concern
accounts of sufficient size to permit reasonable diversification and achievement
of a low turnover rate.80 Furthermore, these cases concerning smaller invest-
ments, to the extent that they involve investment in somewhat unstable securi-
ties, raise a question of the wisdom of individual security investments for
accounts that cannot achieve adequate diversification to achieve the investor's
objectives, and at some point would raise the issue of suitability. 81 Under some
circumstances a smaller account size may justify occasionally higher trading due
to unusual events. However, it does not justify turnover rates greatly dispropor-
tionate to the turnover rates experienced by mutual funds,82 since "unusual"
events by definition do not occur routinely.8 3
$1.6 million), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
424 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (original value of account over $500,000), aff'd and modified, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970).
80. See, eg., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1985) (account value of about $77,000); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 819 (9th
Cir. 1980) (average investment in 1971 was $40,000); Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,799 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (initial purchases of $21,447.66
in margin account); cf STAFF OF THE NEw YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, supra note 77, at 135
("Generally, the larger the [mutual] fund, the less the percentage the manager charges because it is
almost as easy to run a $200,000 account as it is to run a $100,000 account. (You just buy and sell
twice as much of whatever it is you're going to buy and sell.)").
81. Suitability rules lie in several sources. The Manual of the National Association of Securities
Dealers provides: "In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security
holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III, § 2, [1982]
N.A.S.D. Manual (CCII) 1 2152 (March 1988). Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange pro-
vides that a firm should exercise "due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every cus-
tomer," Rule 405(1), [1984] N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2405 (March 1989), and this has been
interpreted to require suitable recommendations. N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULA-
TION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2-33 (1977); see generally Zaretsky v.
E.F. Hutton Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allegation of willful failure to invest in
conservative investments known to be more suitable to investor than options actually purchased
satisfies pleading requirement for scienter under rule lOb-5); Cohen, Suitability Doctrine: Defining
Stockbrokers'Professional Responsibilities, 3 J. CORP. L. 533 (1978) (general discussion of suitability
doctrine); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965
DUKE L.J. 445 (same).
The possible direct use of the broker's obligation to have actual knowledge of the security in
question and the "know your customer" rule is slight. As a leading commentator has summarized
the point: "It is unlikely that a violation of these rules without more will provide an independent
basis for private relief by an injured investor, although it may be relevant in an action brought under
SEC rule lOb-5." T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 275.
82. In Mihara, the $40,000 investment was turned over 9.3 times in 1971. Mihara, 619 F.2d at
819. It is difficult to imagine that simple lack of diversification could be responsible for such a degree
of activity. The court concluded that there was excessive trading. Id. at 821.
83. For example, in Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 95,799 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a number of transactions were explained by unusual adverse
events affecting the stocks in the account. Id. at 90,889-90. To the extent that the customer's in-
structions caused the sales of securities, the trading should not be considered excessive and attributa-
ble to the broker. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. If the broker was responsible, however,
he should be held accountable for the undue trading activity. The account in Gleit started with
purchases of $21,447.66. Within two months two of the four stocks purchased, comprising roughly
one-third of the account, were sold due to "their deteriorating condition." Gleit, (1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,889. Within seven months another one-third of the initial
account was sold pursuant to an instruction to sell if the stock's price declined. The final one-third of
the initial account was sold about eight months after purchase, as it "began to feel the effects of the
oil embargo." Id. at 90,890. These vicissitudes of the market are inevitable and precisely the reason
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Finally, one additional point supports the use of mutual funds as a reference
point to estimate optimal turnover rates. While some factors indicate a lower
optimal turnover rate for mutual funds than for broker-managed accounts, other
factors suggest higher turnover rates for mutual fund accounts. Because mutual
funds pay significantly lower commissions to brokers, these expenses on transac-
tions by such funds indicate that, if anything, a greater turnover rate should be
the norm in mutual funds as compared to investment accounts with similar
objectives managed by brokers. 84 Therefore, since these observations indicate a
tendency toward higher turnover rates for mutual funds as compared to turn-
over rates for broker-managed accounts, the use of mutual fund turnover rates
to determine excessive trading of investment accounts will not be unfair.
As the above discussion indicates, in the majority of cases, trading activity
inconsistent with that of mutual funds could be justified by a broker only if the
customer's investment objectives differed from those of mutual funds or the bro-
ker had a realistic expectation of outperforming the mutual funds.85 Otherwise,
that well-advised investors diversify or, if that is not possible, stay out of individual securities and
take a long-term outlook even in times of economic downturn, as evidenced in the Gleit case. The
circumstances of that case illustrate the folly of investing the entire proceeds of a relatively small
account in only four stocks.
Some scholars also believe that turnover should not be affected by the degree of risk or objec-
tives of the client. Professors Jennings and Marsh take such a view:
There would seem to be little, if any, logical connection between the mere rate of
portfolio turnover and the investment risk and resulting losses of principal from decline in
market values .... However, churning seems to take place almost invariably in highly
volatile securities, for the obvious reason that there must be some plausible reason for
taking the customer out of one security and putting him into the next one.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 2, at 641. Professors Jennings and Marsh then ask whether
the use of more volatile stocks in order to cover churning is a part of the churning case or a separate
suitability violation. Id. Compare Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir.
1970) (use of volatile stocks is a separate suitability violation) with Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493
F.2d 1036, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1974) (use of volatile stocks is part of the churning offense) and with
McQuesten v. Advest, Inc., [1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,011, at 90,722 (D. Mass. Aug. 4,
1988) ("Finally, it should be appropriate on the issue of churning to consider suitability of invest-
ments, a matter where defendants come off poorly."). Thus, a poorly diversified portfolio of volatile
or unstable stocks conceivably could be used as an excuse for excessive trading.
84. Commissions can approach $1.00 per share on full service accounts and $.30 per share even
on discount broker accounts. This amount is significantly higher than the approximately $.10 per
share cost that large mutual funds and other institutional investors pay to trade. Therefore, the same
turnover ratio in a broker-managed account and a mutual fund account with exactly the same com-
position of securities will leave the broker-managed account with a lower return. If all other things
are equal, the difference in transaction costs indicates that broker-managed accounts should have
lower turnover rates than mutual funds with similar objectives.
Of course, in order to determine the total impact on portfolio return and incentives regarding
trading activity, one should also consider other relevant costs. Examples include mutual fund sales
and management fees and miscellaneous broker-managed account fees. Other fees not specifically
examined here, however, do not bear so directly on the trading activity as do the typical broker
commissions charged, which, as discussed above, vary directly with the number of trades. See Poser,
supra note 2, at 577 n.38 ("Of course, an investment adviser would not be likely to have an incentive
to churn an account unless his compensation were related to the commissions generated."). Thus,
the turnover rates of mutual funds in general should be valid benchmarks for reasonable activity
levels in portfolios with similar investment objectives.
85. For example, the Fidelity Magellan fund had a turnover rate from 1978 to 1980 of 2.38 to
3.38 when its net assets remained below $100 million. The smaller size apparently permitted higher
activity. But the returns ranged from 32% to 70% for those three years. Returns and turnover rates
decreased significantly in subsequent years. MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 305 (1989). Realisti-
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the customer's funds might have been better placed with mutual funds in the
first instance.
B. The Data From Mutual Funds
Mutual funds fall into ten primary categories according to their investment
objectives. 86 Nine of these categories include funds with similar risk-return or
investment objectives. The other category, which this study did not use, is com-
prised of a variety of "specialty" funds with various objectives; accordingly,
these funds are not good reference points for the purposes of this study.
87
The funds in these nine categories of interest represent a spectrum of goals,
At one end of the investment objective continuum, aggressive growth funds offer
increased returns with high risk.88 In contrast, an income fund's objective is
steady, moderate income with lower risk.89
Table 1 lists the fund types and turnover data for each type.90 In general,
cally, the average broker could not expect to match the performance of the Fidelity Magellan fund
for the years 1978 to 1980.
86. MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 31 (1985) (relating investment objectives that span the range
of normal or commonly accepted objectives).
87. The exclusion of this category for lack of a coherent or unified objective for these funds
serves another useful purpose. Some of these specialty funds purchase the market portfolio in a
particular industry and hold it. Such a strategy would result in an abnormally low turnover rate and
bias our conclusions if the data from that category were included.
88. An example of the objective and strategy of one typical aggressive growth fund is described
as follows:
Putnam Voyager Fund's objective is capital appreciation. Current income is not a
factor in portfolio selection.
This Fund pursues its objective by choosing a portfolio of "foundation" growth fnd
"opportunity" stocks. "Foundation" growth holdings are small, high quality, rapidly
growing profitable companies with a proprietary or low cost position in their industries,
They must conduct their businesses in a manner that maintains profitability.
"Opportunity" companies may not have the established past record of the "founda-
tion" growth companies, but they are poised to show strong earnings growth and improv-
ing profitability. Growth opportunities can arise from the introduction of new products,
rejuvenated management, a change in the economy, or a change in the public's perception
of the company.
This Fund searches for companies with growth potential that it believes can become
tomorrow's "blue chips."
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 542 (1987).
89. An income fund's objectives are typically described as follows:
American National Income Fund seeks to provide its shareholders with current in-
come. A secondary but important objective is long-term capital appreciation. Manage-
ment of this Fund believes that capital growth is important in protecting against inflation
as well as in providing an expanded base for income return. It considers both present and
potential yield and potential capital appreciation.
Id. at 56.
90. For each type of fund category in Table 1, 25 funds were selected randomly from the 1987
edition of the MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK, which contains data for all mutual funds for which
there is public information. Each fund is categorized here as characterized according to the groups
used in the MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOoK. For those categories with fewer than 25 members, all
were selected. Those categories containing fewer than 25 members were aggressive growth (19),
balanced (20), equity income (21), and option income (9). The mean turnover rates and the standard
deviations given for each category represent an analysis of turnover data for each year from 1978
through 1987.
The use of ten years of data for each of the funds selected in each category gives our data
multiple pictures (on average 200) of turnover activity for each category. The sample means, there-
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the average turnover figures reported in Table 191 are consistent with composite
turnover sample figures for mutual funds with growth, growth and income, and
balanced funds, which rose from an average turnover rate of 0.46 in 1978 to
0.759 by 1983.92
The data indicates that there are real differences between the estimated op-
timum rates for diverse investment objectives. The majority of the differences in
the mean turnover rates indicated in Table 1 are statistically significant, which
indicates that differences in the sample means are almost certainly not random
occurrences and the optimal means for turnover rates apparently do vary be-
tween funds managed under distinctly different investment objectives. This con-
clusion was drawn from a computation of t statistics 93 for each possible pair of
combinations, which are reported below in Table 2. More than half of the possi-
ble combinations show that turnover rates significantly differ between categories.
We can say, therefore, with almost complete confidence, that such categories
have different optimal turnover rates. For example, the mean turnover ratio for
the aggressive growth funds shows significantly more turnover than does the
mean for the balanced funds94 (t ratio = -7.20). 95
fore, are good estimates of the population means. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the
true mean of the aggressive growth category is computed as 1.18 + or - 2.05(.72) divided by the
square root of 156 = 1.30 to 1.06. For the equity income category, it is .70 + or - 2.05(.53)
divided by the square root of 179 = .78 to .62. See R. PFAFFENBERGER & J. PATTERSON, STATISTI-
CAL METHODS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIcs 260-61 (1981). Therefore, the sample turnover rates
are representative of the population means, and we have a high degree of confidence that they are
right.
The construct of weak-form efficiency holds that price changes are independent of past prices.
Because of this, portfolio management activities (turnover) are in response to expected security price
behavior and are not a function of past activities; hence, each picture of a mutual fund in each of the
ten years is an independent event and should be counted as such in computing the standard devia-
tions and confidence intervals given above. Any predilections of the managers of such funds are a
function of how they view the market, which is random, ex ante, if markets are efficient.
91. The turnover ratios taken from the Mutual Fund Sourcebook are "computed by taking the
lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities under one year) and dividing by
average monthly assets." MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 32 (1985). This is a reasonable estimate of
turnover as discussed in the legal authorities, even if it would tend to lower by a small amount the
resulting turnover figure. See supra note 48. Better information is not currently available to avoid
this difficulty with the use of mutual fund data or to determine precisely the amount of any error.
This aspect of the study justifies a caution, which we believe should be applied to the use of quantita-
tive measures generally, against assigning too great a weight to any particular figure or figures.
92. See Berkowitz & Logue, supra note 60, at 40. The figures reported by Berkowitz and Logue
are consistent with those reported in this Article, which yield a composite turnover ratio of 0.72 for
aggressive growth, growth and income, and balanced funds over the period from 1978 through 1987.
Those authors note that turnover rates for investments have generally increased in recent years
due to a decline in trading costs. This means that our figures may not be good for all time. We
believe that our figures, however, represent a fair comparison to the turnover rates discussed in the
cases and other legal authorities that necessarily looked to prior years' motivations as well.
93. For a general description of t statistics that constitute a special method of analysis used in
small sample estimation and which allow us in this case to draw the conclusions in the text without
drawing a greater sample size, see T. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS
FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 166-73 (1972).
94. A balanced fund has been described as follows:
Eaton & Howard Balanced Fund seeks to provide reasonable income and long-term
growth of principal and income to its shareholders, This Fund consistently maintains a
balance in its portfolio between bonds, preferred stocks and common stocks. The debt
securities provide relative stability of principal and income, while the common stocks en-
able increases in principal and income.
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TABLE 1
FUND CATEGORY AND TURNOVER STATISTICS
Mean Mean Plus A Number
Turnover Std. Standard Deviations
Category Rate Dev. 1 S.D. 2 S.D. 3 S.D.
Aggressive Growth (AG) 1.18 .72 1.90 2.62 3.35
Balanced (Bal) .66 .58 1.23 1.81 2.38
Equity Income (EI) .70 .53 1.23 1.76 2.29
Growth (G) .98 .61 1.58 2.19 2.80
Growth-Income (GI) .53 .55 1.09 1.64 2.19
International (Int) .55 .42 .96 1.38 1.79
Option-Income (01) 1.45 .74 2.19 2.93 3.67
Small Company (SC) .54 .39 .93 1.32 1.71
Income (Inc) .58 .40 .98 1.39 1.79
This study yields the sample means that reasonably approximate the aver-
age (and therefore assumed optimum) turnover rates for accounts with invest-
ment goals corresponding to those of the categories of mutual funds listed in
Table 1. The existence of significant differences between the sample means of
the various categories of funds shows that the choice of investment objective
influences the amount of turnover in funds handled by professional money man-
agers. Excessive trading inconsistent with the stated goals of the investor should
push its turnover rate above others of its type.
Tables 1 and 2 show that the turnover ratios for income, balanced, and
growth-income 96 funds are relatively low and, in general, not significantly differ-
ent. Managers of these funds generally invest in securities of mature firms. In-
terestingly, both international97 and small company 98 funds also have low
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 109 (1987).
95. A similar comparison shows that option-income funds also exhibit significantly more turno-
ver than do the balanced funds (t ratio = 8.25). For an explanation that a t ratio of 1.96 or more
indicates a significant difference in the population means at a .05 level, see R. PFAFFENBERGER & 1.
PATTERSON, supra note 90, at 349-51, 705. In other words, in 95% of all possible samples, the two
means will in fact be different.
96. A description of the investment criteria for a growth income fund follows:
New Beginning Income and Growth Fund's goals are to provide shareholders with the
opportunity to invest in a diversified portfolio of securities to achieve above-average income
while preserving capital, and secondarily to seek capital appreciation.
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 287 (1985). A description of an equity-income fund's criteria is as
follows:
Fidelity Equity Income Fund seeks reasonable income; in selecting securities it also
considers the potential for capital appreciation.
This Fund invests primarily in income-producing equity securities which have a yield
higher than the composite yield on the stocks in the S & P. Normally, at least 80% of the
Fund's assets are in income-producing common or preferred stocks. The remainder of the
portfolio tends to be invested in debt obligations, most of which are convertible into com-
mon stock.
Id. at 129. The equity-income type of fund is now referred to in the MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK
as fitting within the growth-income category. MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK (1989).
97. An example of the investment criteria of an international fund is:
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TABLE 2
T STATISTICS
Cat. AG Bal EI G GI Int 0I SC Inc
AG -7.2* -6.89* -2.84* -9.3 * -9.47* 2.59* -9.67* -9.28*
Bal .68 5.32* -2.09* -1.94 8.25* -2.12* -1.49
EI 4.82* -2.93* -2.84* 7.99* -3.04* -2.33*
G -1.71 -7.96* 4.96* -8.2 * -7.74*
GI .31 9.78* .14 1.01




* significantly different at .05
turnover ratios, even though these funds might be characterized as more risky or
speculative than many of the other categories. In the case of the small company
funds this probably results from the long-term investment horizon required for
the growth and maturation of small or start-up companies.
As one might anticipate, growth, aggressive growth, 99 and option-in-
come 1° ° funds exhibit higher turnover ratios than any of the other fund catego-
ries. The most turnover occurs in the option-income funds in which brokers
Templeton World Fund's objective is long-term capital growth, which it seeks to achieve
through a flexible policy of investing in stocks and debt obligations of companies and gov-
ernments of any nation.
Id. at 632 (1987).
98. An example of the description of the investment criteria of a small company fund begins as
follows:
Lord Abbett Developing Growth Fund's objective is long-term growth of capital.
This Fund's investment strategy is based on the concept that of the four phases of
corporate growth, only the second or developing growth phase is characterized by a dra-
matic rate of growth. This Fund looks for companies in that phase, although it may also
purchase new issues. Developing growth companies are almost always small, usually
young, and their shares are generally traded over-the-counter. Having passed the pitfalls
of the formative years, they are now in a position to grow rapidly in their market.
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 249 (1985).
99. The description of the investment criteria of one aggressive growth fund states:
Armstrong Associates' objective is capital growth. Any interest or dividend income gener-
ated by the portfolio is incidental.
This Fund emphasizes investments in common stocks that have the prospect of earn-
ings growth or asset enhancement over a one-to three-year period. However, it may sell
securities within a relatively short period if developments with respect to the issuer, the
equity markets or the economy indicate that an investment change would be advisable.
The Fund can also vary the proportions of equity and short-term debt investments in its
portfolio.
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 78 (1987).
100. A description of an option-income fund's investment criteria begins:
Gateway Option Income Fund seeks a high current return at a reduced level of risk.
This Fund intends to invest at least 95% of its assets in common stocks with respect to
which call options are traded on an exchange. Generally, covered call options are written
on such common stocks at the time of their purchase by the Fund.
MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 183 (1985).
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frequently generate cash flows by writing short-term call options against stocks
held in the option-income funds' own portfolios. 101
One can utilize the data in Table 1 to estimate what level of turnover activ-
ity indicates excessive trading for accounts with corresponding investment goals.
For each category, one can determine a broad confidence interval within which
the turnover figure for an account of that category should lie within a specified
degree of certainty. The statistical likelihood of such a turnover rate randomly
exceeding the statistically approximated rate by more than two standard devia-
tions is 2.5%.102 The likelihood of the turnover rate randomly exceeding the
mean by three standard deviations is only 0.5%. For example, for the income
fund category, which had a sample mean of 0.58, a turnover ratio of 1.38 lies
two standard deviations above the mean. It is unlikely that an income account
invested in accordance with the funds' objective would exhibit a turnover rate at
this high level.
C. Suggestions For Lower Benchmarks For Turnover Rates
While the discussion above indicates that this study serves as a starting
point for ascertaining acceptable turnover rates for accounts with different in-
vestment objectives, ' 03 we do not regard this point as the major contribution of
the Article. Beyond attempting to estimate optimal turnover rates for broker-
managed accounts with specific investor objectives, an overall and more funda-
mental observation about turnover rates in general is pertinent. Only the aggres-
sive growth and option-income fund categories generated data justifying an
annual turnover rate in excess of three.'14 Therefore, it should be difficult for an
investment adviser to justify a turnover rate in excess of three for any account in
the absence of an unusual objective, such as a desire for high short-term profits.
The data produced by this study support this conclusion relating to common
investment objectives even more than the findings as to specific investment
objectives listed in Table 1.
These observations stand in sharp contrast to the general approaches of
courts and commentators. A survey of the relevant case law indicates that an-
nual turnover ratios that seem fairly high by the standards of this study have
been tolerated by the courts, often with some degree of confidence.' 05 In Gleit v.
101. For a discussion of whether the limited use of options should disqualify this category from
turnover rate analysis, see supra note 23.
102. Because of the nature of t(z) test, such a figure is not often referenced, but the likelihood of
such a turnover rate exceeding the relevant mean by more than one standard deviation is 16%.
103. Further empirical work should add certainty to our conclusions. We expect that, with
further research, an even more systematic relation between investment objectives and respective ac-
ceptable turnover ratios could be developed. Directions for some further work include additional
study of mutual fund data, in terms of greater sampling, reexamination of the categories of funds by
type, and analysis of the change in turnover rates over time. Additional proxies other than mutual
funds might also be studied.
104. The mean turnover rate for aggressive growth and option-income funds exhibited a turno-
ver rate in excess of three only at the 97.5% confidence interval (i.e., within three standard devia-
tions). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (table I and data).
105. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (annualized
rate of about seven not excessive for speculative investor). Even the so-called 24-6 rule does not
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Shearson, Hammill & Co.'0 6 the court stated that a turnover ratio of 2.97
seemed not excessive for an account with an investment goal of accumulating
capital to defray children's college expenses. Another court, in Van Alen v.
Dominick & Dominick, Inc.107 stated that a turnover ratio of three was not
excessive in the abstract or apparently for any investment objective and was
further "not excessive in light of the [investor's] intent to 'build up' her ac-
count."' 0 8 The Van Alen court flatly stated that no court had found excessive
trading based on an annual turnover ratio of three, plainly suggesting that such a
rate was low.'0 9 Yet another court, in Grove v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc.,110
concluded without significant comment that no excessive trading was indicated
from the annual turnover ratio of 1.87 in light of the investor's goal of "increas-
ing the return on her investment above the return on fixed income securities.""'I
These authorities seem to suggest that almost any modest goal, other than
earning money market interest, would justify a turnover rate in excess of two or
three. In addition, and contrary to the findings of this study, the courts seem
inattentive to the role of investor objectives in evaluating whether excessive trad-
ing occurred. Instead, courts adopt the higher turnover rates commonly associ-
ated with high risk investments as the threshold level, even when evaluating
excessive trading as it relates to conservative investor objectives.
This broad-brush analysis used by the courts to bolster their holdings is
unnecessary in light of our data. For example, while relatively conservative in-
vestment goals suggest a low turnover rate, the broker strategy adopted in Grove
(and apparently approved by the customer), which involved the use of covered
calls, appears justified by our study; it results in a normal turnover rate only
modestly higher than the rates for mutual funds with similar investment objec-
tives.' 12 The court could have strengthened its conclusion by noting that the
turnover of 1.87 was generally high, but the data on option-income funds show a
mean of 1.45 for such funds.113 Thus, in this modest use of our findings relating
to one specific investment objective, the 1.87 figure seems not excessive for such
an account. Similarly, in Van Alen it was reasonably clear that the client ap-
presume churning until the turnover rate reaches four. The possibility of churning is not even indi-
cated by this rule until the rate exceeds two, which suggests that a turnover rate of two plus is a
minimum figure.
106. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,799 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. 441 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
108. Id. at 401.
109. Id. But see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
110. [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,229 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
111. Id. at 95,980. The Grove case dealt with an investment program consisting of fixed income
securities, common stock, and covered calls. Id. at 95,979. The writing of covered calls potentially
takes this situation into the specific concern relating to options. See Poser, supra note 2, at 601. The
court's use of the turnover rate, however, shows no awareness of such special concerns relating to
options, and its comments were offered as a blanket statement of the acceptability of such rates for
all types of accounts. Grove, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,980.
112. We noted above the difficulties with using turnover rate analysis with option accounts. See
supra note 23. This limited consideration of turnover rate in connection with the use of covered calls
seems justified in light of the customer's holding of the underlying stock. Moreover, in light of the
strategy of such accounts, it seems natural to expect a higher turnover rate, but not one greatly out
of line with other investment strategies.
113. See supra text accompanying note 91 (Table 1).
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proved or acquiesced in a strategy of intermediate trading with short-term trans-
actions, a strategy that necessarily would seem to involve higher turnover.
114
Indeed, this strategy, which goes beyond the aggressive investment strategies in
our data, might be incapable of being analyzed in terms of a normal or optimum
turnover rate and it might be more enlightening to analyze whether the trading
strategy as executed made logical sense and turnover was minimized.11 5 If such
alternative analyses were recognized expressly by the courts, there would be no
need to make broad statements about what is a generally adequate turnover rate.
Indeed, the greater danger in the loose general statements about the accept-
ability of turnover rates in the abstract lies in the promotion of a false attitude
about normal trading activity. Such loose statements create an atmosphere in
which generally high rates are seen as acceptable and the minimum rates
deemed excessive will be correspondingly too high. In a sense, they encourage
as a next step the setting of unreasonably high threshold rates for excessiveness.
An early and prominent example of this type of undesirable influence of
loose analysis can be found in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.116 In that
case the court apparently intended to hold that a turnover of 1.85 was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to establish excessive trading.117 Even though it has
been observed that the Rolf case involved an investor "who expected that his
funds would be used for trading rather than long term investment,"' 18 with the
consequent expectation that activity in the account would be heavier than for
normal investment accounts, the court went out of its way to suggest that annual
turnover rates higher than 1.85 might also be inadequate to establish excessive
trading in more typical cases.' 19 To this effect the court read the magical figure
of six as something approaching a minimum threshold, and it stated that "an
annual turnover rate will not be considered excessive unless it begins to ap-
proach six."' 120 This assumes that the authorities suggesting that an annual
turnover rate greater than six is excessive also endorse a negative inference that
an annual turnover rate less than six is not excessive. The influence of loose
statements from cases like Van Alen is readily apparent in the significant citation
of and reliance upon Van Alen in the Ro/f opinion.
121
Once this process started, its spread was almost inevitable. Subsequent de-
114. Van Alen, 441 F. Supp. at 401.
115. This is similar to the analysis of churning in options suggested by Professor Poser. See
Poser, supra note 2, at 598.
116. 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and modified, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
117. Id. at 1039.
118. Poser, supra note 2, at 582 n.70.
119. Rol, 424 F. Supp. at 1039. This analysis is open to the same kind of criticism suggested
with respect to the Van Alen case. If the particular objectives of the customer justify a higher turno-
ver rate, it is not necessary to make general statements about the excessiveness of turnover in the
abstract.
120. Id. The Rofcourt concluded that 1.85 "was not excessive under the decisions" and further
interpreted the Harvard Note to mean that even higher figures were not excessive: "Indeed, it is the
view of at least one commentator that an annual turnover rate will not be considered excessive unless
it begins to approach six." Id. at 1039 (referring to HARVARD Note, supra note I).
121. See id.
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cisions apparently accepted the often mentioned magical figure of six to be a
general minimum figure, rather than simply a figure at which excessive trading is
likely to be found. In Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc. 122 the court
held that an annual turnover rate of about two was insufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss in the absence of the pleading of other special circum-
stances. 12 3 The Siegel court further related an argument by the defendants that
"the claim as stated warrants dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in light of the
principle that an annual turnover rate of less than six will not normally be con-
sidered excessive," 124 without questioning it and apparently, as did the Rolf
court, accepted it as a negative inference from the oft-stated rule that a rate
greater than six is normally excessive. Similarly, in Hempel v. Blunt, Ellis and
Loewi, Inc. 125 the court held that an annual turnover ratio of about three would
not withstand a motion to dismiss. 126 The Hempel court also apparently inter-
preted the common benchmark figure of six in a manner similar to the Siegel
court's interpretation. 127
These more recent decisions seem to be misreading the Harvard Law Re-
view Note's suggestion of six as a key figure,128 but the problems with these cases
are more substantial. They involved situations in which a high level of trading
activity was not so easily justified as in a case like Rolf. The degree to which the
Siegel and Hempel courts were affected by a misguided attitude or notion of
what constitutes normal trading activity is indicated by the lack of significance
they attributed to the plaintiffs' allegations of "conservative" investment objec-
tives.' 29 And in Hempel the plaintiff-customer was, furthermore, "an elderly
widow" who was an "unsophisticated investor" placing $102,000, most of her
life savings, with the broker. 130 One can only wonder what these courts would
accept as an allegation of special circumstances sufficient to create an issue of
fact.
Although some judicial authorities do exhibit a greater willingness to find
122. 658 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
123. Id. at 554 ("Absent other allegations of special circumstances, not present here, an annual
turnover rate of 2.00 is simply too low to justify a claim for churning in this District."). The Siegel
court thus granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the churning count, despite the investor's al-
leged conservative investment goals. Id. at 553-54.
124. Id. at 553.
125. 123 F.R.D. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
126. See id. at 317-18 (turnover of at most two for eight months).
127. The Hempel court stated: "In the commentary cited by the Costello court for its definition
of turnover ratio, it is said that the annual turnover ratio will not be considered excessive unless it
approaches six." Id. at 317 (citation omitted) (citing HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 819).
128. The more natural interpretation of that authority is that an annual turnover of six is likely
to be excessive. These courts appear to be stretching to draw a negative inference for ratios of less
than six. See HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 876.
129. Siegel, 658 F. Supp. at 553 ("Plaintiff alleges that he communicated his conservative invest-
ment goals to defendants"); Hempel, 123 F.R.D. at 314 (investor was "placed in the 'conservative'
investment category").
130. Hempel, 123 F.R.D. at 314. In addition, the investments in Hempel apparently were in
various mutual funds. See id. at 317 (Kemper Option Income Fund, Oppenheimer Premium Income
Fund, and American Capital Government Securities Fund). In general, for obvious reasons, rapid
turnover of investments in mutual fund shares makes even less sense than does rapid turnover in
shares of stock in operating companies. See Harold R. Fenocchio, 46 S.E.C. 279 (1976).
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excessive trading,131 the apparently growing number of decisions to the contrary
represents a basic misunderstanding of the level of activity to be expected for
investment accounts. They seem generally uiaware that the turnover rates
under their consideration lie at the high end of the spectrum of activity for ac-
counts based on normal investment goals and that excessive trading takes place
at annual turnover rates well below six. This misunderstanding by courts of the
relevance of investor objectives and the relationship between investor objectives
and turnover rates indicates a flaw in current methods for analyzing churning
claims.
Courts should lower their threshold levels of the optimum turnover rates to
account for the average (non-speculative) investor's objectives. A moment's re-
flection about the costs involved in securities transactions bolsters this proposi-
tion. It is difficult to conceive of a normal (non-speculative) investment strategy
that would cause a broker to trade at an annual turnover rate of two, because the
commissions at this level of trading would effectively consume most or all of the
gains and appreciation. 132 Moreover, the sale of stock at a gain is a taxable
event, which triggers income tax liability. 133 Between the commissions and
taxes, the costs of trading can discourage an investor from pursuing modest re-
turns on his investment. In short, an investor's desire to achieve a return in
excess of that earned by a money market account should not cause courts to
adopt without serious question turnover rates that more than double the opti-
mum figures for the fund categories studied.
We believe that our suggestions could be best summarized as an attempt to
set new and lower benchmarks for turnover rates considered to be normal for
typical investment accounts. Turnover figures such as two or three times per
year cannot be justified, without explanation, as necessary to achieve normal
investment goals. No one would suggest that a portfolio designed to achieve
conservative investment goals should normally and without question turn over
twice in one year. Special circumstances and investor instructions may lead to
approval of such a rate in a particular case, but the process should not be en-
tered with the expectation, as is apparent in some of the authorities, that two or
three is about normal in the abstract.
We also argue against implementing a level of rigid tiers with accompany-
131. See, eg., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968) (turn-
over "average of two plus per year . . . was clearly excessive"). The SEC has on a number of
occasions found excessive trading on the basis of turnover rates below two. I S. GOLDBERG, supra
note 14, at 2-47 & n.123 ("In contrast [to the Ro/f dicta], the Securities and Exchange Commission
has determined excessiveness in ten instances where the account's annualized turnover rate was
below... 1.85."); see, e-g., J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 95 (1962) (several annual turnover rates of
less than 2.0 excessive).
132. I S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-62 (annual turnover rate of 2.0 would result in commis-
sions of about 8% per year).
133. See B. BITrKER & M. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS § 25.2
(1988). There are few exceptions to this rule of recognition for tax purposes on the sale of stock.
One is the nonrecognition status for certain sales of stock to employee stock ownership plans. See
I.R.C. § 1042 (Supp. 1987). Taxes in this context are at most a timing difference if the marginal tax
rates remain constant for the investor. Of course, this is only an additional cost if the account has
gains.
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ing irrebutable presumptions. Such a system would likely be perceived as creat-
ing a safe harbor and zones of varying exposure, such that behavior might be
distorted. Similarly, a rule that automatically or irrefutably faulted brokers for
turnover rates lying in the top 2.5% of the distribution, for example, would also
be undesirable, because it is inevitable that some small number of accounts or
funds will be in the top of the distribution.
We believe that some use of a weaker form of presumption would be helpful
to the courts. Depending to some extent on the specific investment objectives as
reflected in the mutual fund data in the tables above, an appropriate annual
turnover rate should be seen as lying in the neighborhood of one; rates increas-
ing beyond that should be viewed with skepticism. As the rate increases much
beyond one, the broker should bear the burden of explaining the higher than
normal rate.134 Once the rate rises to about three, there should be little room
for argument about the excessive trading element of the claim,135 in the absence
of an investment motive or strategy that is not accounted for in our data.
These suggestions do not mean that the turnover rate should be the exclu-
sive method of determining the presence of excessive trading. It is, however, the
only direct measure of the level of trading in an account and therefore has
achieved some deserved prominence in the cases. In appropriate cases where the
level of the turnover rate is ambiguous but suggestive of churning, other evi-
dence such as commissions earned and in-and-out trading should be relevant
and may be dispositive.
The important point is that our study should sharpen the use of the turno-
ver rate as our findings provide a good basis for estimating with confidence the
normal turnover rates to be expected with common investment motives. With
some of the "fat" removed from the turnover rate measure, it can be used with
increased assurance. As should be clear from the above discussion, this does not
mean that a high turnover rate automatically demonstrates excessive trading.
Other considerations are, of course, relevant even after active trading is
established.
D. Limits of the Turnover Rate Model
Having suggested reliance on a refined quantitative measure, which might
appear simple and straightforward, we also should recognize some of the basic
limitations on its use. First, the turnover rate only addresses the element of
churning known as excessive trading, and other elements such as broker control
134. See T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 284 (in cases in which excessive trading would seem to be
indicated by a high turnover rate or patterns of trading, "the burden would presumably shift to the
broker to justify this activity").
135. We do not wish to overemphasize the difficulty faced by the broker who seeks to explain
such a rate. For example, Fidelity Magellan Fund has been one of the most successful funds in
recent years. It averaged turnover of 1.96 per year from 1975 to 1984, including one year with the
rate exceeding three. See MUTUAL FUND SOURCEBOOK 134 (1985). This shows that on occasion
good managers will have a higher turnover rate, but presumably they can also explain it and, per-
haps as in the Fidelity Magellan case, the returns will also justify it.
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over the account must also be established.13 6 A high level of trading activity
without broker control does not make out a churning claim.
137
Second, turnover rates derived from a study of mutual funds should not be
taken as conclusively establishing excessive trading. Implementing a level of
rigid tiers based on this study with accompanying irrebuttable presumptions
would mislead the courts and might-result in unfair treatment of brokers who
otherwise could justify their high trading levels. If the customer insists on a
pattern of trades or an investment strategy or goal that results in a high degree
of activity, the broker does not engage in trading that is excessive in light of the
investor's goals.138 The customer may also direct that certain specific trades be
made, 139 a direction that would appear to remove such a trade from the group
that potentially constituted excessive trading, even if all trades authorized as
well as unauthorized should be included in calculating the turnover rate.140 In
this context, the cases tend to support the idea that aggressive goals make it
136. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (other elements must be satis-
fied to make out a churning claim); 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at 2-42 ("Accordingly, the
presence of any one element absent the other will be insufficient as a matter of law to constitute the
fraudulent practice of churning.").
137. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1982) (client actively
involved in the management of his account cannot successfully maintain churning action); M & B
Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1110-11 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (control of account by
account executive not established), aff'd, 795 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986). For example, control might
not be proven if the client were directly involved in the broker's activity with the account and was
consulted on a routine basis and had meaningful influence about suggested courses of action.
Control is an issue that is beyond the scope of our suggestions. We take no position on it,
except to point out that the elements other than excessive trading activity must be satisfied in order
to make out a churning case. See, eg., Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 461 F. Supp.
951, 954-55 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (broker did not assume control of nondiscretionary account), aff'd
mem., 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Poser, supra note 2, at 581; cf Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (1lth Cir. 1985) ("Though Arceneaux apparently
discussed his account frequently with Ribaudo, the jury could have concluded from Arcencaux's
testimony that he was somewhat intimidated by his broker and reluctant to make suggestions or
contradict any suggestions that Ribaudo made."); O'Hara, supra note 2, at 1889 (reliance on broker
establishes control).
138. T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 63 (Supp. 1988) ("on appropriate facts a showing that a large
amount of trading was consistent with the customer's investment objectives can refute a claim of
churning") (citing Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1984-85 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,936 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). As the Seventh Circuit has stated:
[I]f a salesman does only what the customer independently has in mind as an objective, has
authority so to do, and fulfills any fiduciary duty to furnish fair advice, the additional
motive of the salesman to earn commissions does not convert the transactions into a decep-
tive or manipulative device in violation of Section 10(b).
Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (7th Cir. 1974).
139. See HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 876 n.65 (high turnover "may be countered. .. by a
showing that the customer insisted on certain of the sales").
140. In Jaeger v. Presscott, Ball & Turben, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,823 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court noted:
Defendants contend that only unauthorized transactions should be included in the compu-
tation of turnover ratio. This is not correct. Transactions made by a plaintiff based on the
recommendations of the broker are considered when determining whether the broker had
"control" of the account and are therefore part of the churning violation. These transac-
tions, although apparently authorized, must be included in the turnover ratio to measure
accurately all the questionable activity in the account.
Id. at 90,137 n.4.
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easier to conclude that a turnover rate is not excessive.1 41 Evidence of such
instructions that deviate from the typical investment goals reflected in the trad-
ing of mutual funds would, of course, be highly relevant to the issue.
Several reasons, however, point to a need for caution before courts accept
broker explanations of the trading activity. First, even a trading account can be
churned.142 This situation may exist in cases when the customer's investment
objectives made use of a trading account inappropriate. 143 Or the investor's lim-
ited financial resources may also require that the trading rate be reduced, even in
141. See Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[w]here
the goals of the investor are aggressive it is easier to conclude that the trading was not excessive");
Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (if investor has aggressive and
speculative goals, it is easier to conclude that trading rate is not excessive); Miley v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (higher rate more easily justified for trading
account than investment account); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir.
1977) (annual ratio of about seven not excessive for speculative investor), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978); Jaeger v. Presscott, Ball & Turben, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,823
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("In this case, plaintiffs have apparently entered into a trading account which ordi-
narily entails high trading activity and large commission."); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff had to show not only excessive trading, but also
that his investment goals did not call for a high amount of trading), aff'd in part and modified, 570
F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 932 (stable income
accounts should have less activity than a trading account of a wealthy individual); HARVARD Note,
supra note 1, at 875 (greater volume usually expected with trading accounts).
In Rolf the court stated:
[P]laintiff's primary goal was capital growth; he was willing to take the risks involved in
short-term trading, and he never instructed [the adviser] not to engage in short-swing
trades. Plaintiff's twice stated investment intent was to double his equity; indeed, in 1969
he expected his equity to double in approximately one year. In brief, the Court concludes
that [the plaintiff] was a trader, not an investor, and that he is now estopped from main-
taining that there was excessive trading in his account.
RoIf, 424 F. Supp. at 1039; see also Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 (1st Cir.)
(objective changed by acquiescence from investment to trading), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973);
Grove v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,229, at
99,229 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (customer consented to or ratified transactions); Van Alen v. Dominick &
Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (customer estopped from claiming she was long-
term investor rather than trader who holds only so long as conditions remain favorable by frequent
contract with broker, knowledge of transactions and failure to object), aff'd, 560 F,2d 547 (2d Cir.
1977).
142. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (even a trading
account can be churned), aff'd and modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (1970); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 932
n.361 (same).
143. One manner of showing that the activity in a trading account was excessive is to show that
the investor's objectives were inconsistent with a trading account and the broker convinced the in-
vestor that the trading account was a good idea. In Jaeger v. Presscott, Ball & Turben, [1984 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,823 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court stated:
Churning with respect to [a trading] account, where there is normally more activity than in
a standard account, requires factual allegations in addition to just the trades involved. The
complaint must set forth facts sufficient to constitute a basis for concluding that the volume
of trades was not for sound trading purposes but for the purposes of generating excessive
commissions.... For example, allegations that state in substance and effect that a broker
did not correlate the type of account opened with the customer's known financial situation
would satisfy the additional pleading requirement for a trading account....
Plaintiffs here have alleged that [the account executive] was given an express state-
ment regarding the investment objectives ... [which were conservative investment objec-
tives]. Accordingly, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged excessive trading in light of the
character of the account.
Id. at 90,137.
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the context of a trading account. 144 Thus, simply establishing that the account
is a type recognized under the cases as justifying a higher turnover may not be
sufficient in light of other circumstances in a particular case.
Second, there is some reason to question why some of the possible goals for
accounts should greatly affect the turnover rate. Distinguished legal authorities
have noted the lack of a general reason for increased trading even for speculative
goals. 145 They suggest that churning so often occurs with speculative accounts
because of the culprit's need for a plausible explanation of the increased trading
activity. 146 That, of course, is not a substantial reason. In fact, our findings
suggest that overtrading probably occurs in more conservative accounts, but the
"normal" turnover rate range under existing authorities extends so high that the
courts and the parties have not often recognized it as such.
Third, our data suggest that such an explanation may not be so plausible for
each of the various goals that may be called speculative or aggressive. Our find-
ings suggest that, although optimum turnover rates may differ for diverse invest-
ment goals, the difference is less dramatic than one might believe. For example,
the sample of aggressive growth fund turnover rates yielded a figure of 1.17 as
compared to the more conservative category of balanced funds, which yielded a
figure of .65. Moreover, the rate for the small company funds was .54, and this
type of fund would naturally include speculative or untried stocks. Thus, one
should be careful not to allow too much leeway for aggressive or speculative
investment goals. Short-term trading goals not reflected in mutual funds should
be a different matter and lie beyond the scope of our suggestions.
Finally, we also recognize that unusual circumstances may compel a tempo-
rarily high degree of activity which could distort the turnover rate. For exam-
ple, a radical change in investment strategy may necessitate a sale of current
investments and the purchase of new assets. 147 Other unusual events, such as a
one-time sale for tax purposes, may also create the need for additional trad-
ing.148 Although care must be taken to avoid undue allowance for normal shifts
in investment patterns due to typical events such as swings in the economy,
some consideration must be given to different circumstances that would not be
reflected generally in the mutual fund data. 1
49
144. See McQuesten v. Advest, Inc., [1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,011, at 90,722 (D.
Mass. Aug. 4, 1988) (limited financial resources of investor can be considered by jury to justify a
lower turnover rate for nominal trading account); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 432 (financial condition can
require broker to avoid risk of more active trading).
145. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 2, at 641.
146. Id.
147. For example, the Roo' court observed that "much of the turnover during the year 1969
came as a result of [the adviser's] liquidation of the Stirling securities, a major overhaul of the
account which plaintiff approved." Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and modified in part, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978).
148. HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 876 n.65 (high turnover "may be countered by a showing
of a special justification for a transaction, such as a tax loss"); see Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co,,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,799, at 90,890 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (one end-
of-year sale explained as a "tax savings device").
149. For example, the sale of an asset to take a tax loss may justify the sale of part of a portfolio
one time, but it would not justify a turnover of three or four times in one year.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article presents a study of turnover rates for various mutual fund ac-
counts in an attempt to establish a relationship between investor objectives and
optimal turnover rates for broker-managed accounts. In addition, the study es-
tablishes benchmarks for determining what turnover rates for any particular ac-
count indicate excessive trading.
The observations made from the model should enable the legal and financial
communities to make determinations on the issue of excessive trading with more
confidence. This Article suggests that optimum turnover rates are generally
much lower than leading authorities and commentators previously assumed for
common investment goals. In general, an annual turnover rate in excess of one
and approaching two should raise concerns of overtrading.1 50 Furthermore, by
relating the data produced by this study with the specific investor's objectives for
the account under examination, one can verify more precisely a broker's claim
that high turnover rates were justified by his client's unique investment goals.
This Article, however, is not the last word on the subject. One should ex-
pect that, with further empirical work, an even more systematic correlation be-
tween investment objectives and respective acceptable turnover ratios could be
developed. The data reported here are intended merely to suggest a few tenta-
tive benchmarks.
At base, this Article indicates that courts should approach the analysis of
excessive trading with a different attitude and that future decisions should move
in a somewhat different direction from those currently on the books. Legal au-
thorities suggest that significant deference has been given to the broker's judg-
ment on this issue. The courts and commentators have failed to establish
appropriate turnover rates (or ranges of rates) to be associated with diverse in-
vestment goals. Correction of these tendencies in line with the suggestions de-
rived from our study of mutual fund data should improve significantly the use of
turnover rates in the analysis of the excessive trading element of churning
claims.
150. The confidence intervals for many of the fund categories studied suggest the presence of
excessive trading for many accounts when the annual turnover approaches two. Moreover, no mu-
tual fund category examined in the study has greater than a 2.5% chance that an account traded
with that objective would produce a turnover rate in excess of three, a turnover rate currently toler-
ated by many courts.
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